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THE ARCHITECTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL TIME
Richard Alexander Izquierdo*
ABSTRACT
Bruce Ackerman’s account in his We the People series urges the legal recognition
of constitutional amendments enacted outside of Article V as part of a larger descrip-
tive project concerning the creation of distinct republics within the Constitution of
1787. One of its limitations is that he and other scholars have not fully appreciated the
way in which the original institutional design of the Constitution has facilitated—
and perhaps even anticipated—the construction of subregimes during extraordinary
times. This Article presents constitutional time and presidential incentives for a last-
ing legacy as the most important factors influencing constitutional meaning. It is
constitutional time—the extraordinary historical triggers that open space for a new
regime—that changes constitutional meaning, as the President’s vision tends to pre-
vail over the Court’s. Presidents are incentivized to construct constitutional regimes
by the desire to lock in a legacy against future presidents, political opposition, rival
branches, and the bureaucracy. This process of maintenance and renewal has been in
place since George Washington’s presidency in 1789 and raises important questions
for constitutional theory.
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INTRODUCTION: THE ARCHITECTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL TIME
As a descriptive matter, the idea that the Constitution has been transformed from
its eighteenth century foundations seems plausible and perhaps even persuasive. When
Bruce Ackerman introduced the idea that the United States had three distinct republics
within the same formal, written Constitution of 1787,1 he used a great deal of con-
stitutional theory and history to describe the workings of a dualist regime operating
within higher law and normal politics. Ackerman noted in his “myth of rediscovery”
discussion that lawyers needed to strain history in order to conclude that Franklin
Roosevelt’s Constitution remained faithful and consistent with Madison’s.2 As a re-
sult, his project—greeted with renewed interest after a much-anticipated third volume
in 20143—sought to reconcile the New Deal within American constitutionalism by
emphasizing its ratification by popular mandate. The New Deal in the 1930s, like
Reconstruction in the 1860s, represented a legitimate interpretation of the Constitution
because it was a “new” Constitution approved by the people.4 Thus, Roosevelt may not
follow Madison or even Lincoln and the 39th Congress, but his innovations deserved
equal recognition as those of his predecessors. Moreover, if the New Deal created a
new constitutional regime defined by positive government, then it might seem easier
to justify the Warren Court’s civil liberties “revolution” of the 1950s and 1960s as a
particular extension of the new regime.5 Recognizing the New Deal as a constitutional
moment—and not just as a restoration of Chief Justice Marshall’s Constitution—
clears the way for a more accurate reading of its far-reaching changes.6
While Ackerman’s account is provocative and sophisticated, gathering its fair
share of interest and skepticism, it only begins to shift the emphasis on understanding
constitutional law in a more holistic direction. One of its limitations is that he (like
other scholars writing in this subgenre) may not fully appreciate the way in which the
original institutional design of the Constitution has facilitated—and perhaps even
anticipated—the construction of constitutional regimes during extraordinary political
times. There is an institutional logic to the cycle of constitutional maintenance and
1 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 58–67 (1991).
2 Id. at 62–66.
3 See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014).
4 STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE (1997).
5 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 6–7.
6 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 62.
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renewal that has been in operation since 1789—and it differs in important ways from
his account. Ackerman’s signaling stages are numerous and imprecise, having certain
branches play leading roles in one period, and others providing the crucial “switch
in time” at others.7 The President only comes into play as a major constitutional
actor during the Civil War with Lincoln, as if Presidents Washington, Jefferson, and
Jackson were minor players with limited impact on constitutional baselines.8 More-
over, there is little discussion of the possible motivations that presidents, justices, or
members of Congress may have for taking such risky constitutional maneuvers during
constitutional moments. For this reason, the motivations for such maneuvers have to
be addressed from a broader theoretical framework: one that accounts for incentive
structures within the Constitution. And most importantly, however rich the historical
descriptions of process in Ackerman’s theory, he does not discuss the deeper implica-
tions of historical context imbedded within some of his work: that the largest changes
in American politics—foundational shifts in constitutional baselines—are mainly the
product of constitutional time or exogenous historical shocks that open available space
for new interpretations of the Constitution.
This Article presents constitutional time and presidential incentives for a con-
stitutional legacy as the most important factors influencing constitutional meaning.
Constitutional time refers to the extraordinary historical events that destabilize the
regime and open space for new interpretations and constructions to change or sup-
plement constitutional meaning. The idea of constitutional time here draws inspiration
from Stephen Skowronek’s political time concept in his book The Politics Presidents
Make,9 which provides a typology of presidential authority connected to particular
political regimes. When constitutional time is matched with formal Article II execu-
tive power, the President’s authority to offer a substantive constitutional vision is at
its greatest.10 It is at this point when constitutional baselines realign. While Congress
and the Court may participate in forming and consolidating these changes during con-
stitutional time, it is the President who takes the risks to engage in them—and he does
so in order to lock in his presidential legacy by the strongest means available: the con-
struction of a constitutional regime within the formal, written Constitution of 1787.11
In other words, not only did the institutional design of the Constitution divide power
among the three branches, but it also incentivized actions consistent with each office.
The Presidency was the most innovative creation of the Philadelphia Convention—
and a crucial part of its originality was its centrality to the regime as a whole. That is
to say that it had a role in forming and shaping the regime’s foundations and con-
stitutional baselines. Examples include Washington’s construction of a Federalist
7 See generally 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 1.
8 See generally 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
9 See generally SKOWRONEK, supra note 4, at xi–xvii.
10 See infra Part III.
11 See infra Parts II–III.
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Constitution during the 1790s,12 Lincoln’s attempt to redeem the promissory note of
the Declaration of Independence with the Republican Constitution during the 1860s,13
and Franklin Roosevelt’s institutionalization of positive government on a national
scale through sweeping legislation and judicial consolidation in the 1930s.14 This
process of maintenance and renewal has been in place since 1789, which has broader
implications for constitutional theory: specifically, that the creation of the Executive
anticipated the need for reconciling constitutional time. While the leading Founders
never used the term constitutional time, the political science they applied was de-
signed to overcome the uncertainty and destabilization that historical events had
caused to republics since antiquity.15 American political institutions were crafted with
an awareness of this, especially the Presidency.
In Part I, this Article introduces the unique incentives that presidents have to
lock-in their preferred political commitments through constitutional politics despite
the considerable obstacles and costs associated with such high-risk endeavors. Presi-
dents care about their historical legacy above all else. This institutional orientation
inclines presidents to seek structures that safeguard their priorities against political
uncertainty. Part II then explores the reasons why presidents attempt to lock-in their
political commitments by constructing a new constitutional regime. Since presidents
tend to seek the most secure means available to entrench their legacy, the constitu-
tional regime offers the highest form of protection against encroachments by presi-
dential successors, the rival political party, the Supreme Court, and the bureaucracy.
Part III introduces the importance of constitutional time in construing, changing, and
consolidating meaning through its connection to reconstructive presidential authority
and the constitutional regime. Constitutional time opens constitutional space, which
the President aggressively fills in with a substantive constitutional vision through
a number of different actions. At its extreme, this includes the controversial practice
of departmentalism where the President interprets the Constitution de novo, disre-
garding judicial decisions that interfere with it. This set of dynamics changes the
Constitution by rearranging constitutional baselines. Yet it is only the presence of con-
stitutional time that enables political and judicial actors to push their vision forward.
In Part IV, the Article concludes with examples of constitutional time applied to presi-
dents who achieved different degrees of success in securing their respective constitu-
tional visions. The crisis of the 1780s and the Founding enabled President Washington
to construct a Federalist constitutional regime that endured considerable threats to
its core commitments from President Jefferson, who actually wielded power more
aggressively than Washington did in office. The space that Washington inherited was
12 See infra Part IV.A.
13 See generally 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 120–85.
14 See generally SKOWRONEK, supra note 4, at 288–324.
15 See generally infra Part IV.A (describing Washington’s use of constitutional time, even
though he never said that exact phrase).
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a blank slate in comparison to the more thickened environments that all of his succes-
sors would experience. It was the extraordinary historical context that opened that
space and necessitated a substantive constitutional vision that would fill it. Finally,
the analysis in Part IV concludes with a brief discussion of Theodore Roosevelt’s
presidency, which despite its political potency was quite limited in its constitutional
achievements. This example in particular highlights the elegance of constitutional time
because it shows that even a politically influential president needed a historical open-
ing to achieve a lasting constitutional legacy.
I. PRESIDENTIAL LEGACY AND THE CONSTITUTION
More than anyone else on the national stage, American presidents care about
their historical legacy.16 The presidency has a long-range perspective built in its ori-
entation to political affairs due to its institutional position and operation.17 The office
was designed this way, as Alexander Hamilton alluded to in Federalist 72 describing
the president’s ability to undertake “extensive and arduous enterprises for the public
benefit, requiring considerable time to mature and perfect them.”18 From this in-
stitutional inclination, the President desires and tends to build political structures
that last and can speak to his principles and priorities while in office. Presidents are
remembered for their lasting accomplishments above all else, evident in Thomas
Jefferson’s expansion of the nation’s boundaries through the Louisiana Purchase,
Andrew Jackson’s democratization of national politics, Abraham Lincoln’s eradication
of slavery, Theodore Roosevelt’s nationalist Progressive agenda, Franklin Roosevelt’s
New Deal, and Ronald Reagan’s Conservative Revolution. The President’s natural
tendency towards long-term objectives even pushes him to engage in undertakings
that might be unpopular at the time or that risk becoming so over the long run.19 He
is allowed this luxury as a result of his four-year term in office, his less-pronounced
incentives for re-election (especially during his second term),20 and his heterogeneous
16 Terry M. Moe, Presidents, Institutions, and Theory, in RESEARCHING THE PRESIDENCY
337, 364 (George C. Edwards III et al. eds., 1993) (arguing that the knowledge they will be eval-
uated historically motivates presidents to prioritize leadership over popularity while electoral
incentives encourage legislators to seek popularity).
17 Id.
18 THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, at 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
19 The only reason that the President is always referred to with a masculine pronoun in this
Article is that no President, as of this writing, has been a woman. In time, that may be expected
to change.
20 Some scholars have stated that the President’s re-election incentive is non-existent in
his second term. See Moe, supra note 16, at 363. However, an alternative view of the Presi-
dent’s second term may attribute a re-election incentive by including the President’s desire to
have his own party’s nominee elected as part of the President’s broader legacy. At the very
least, it may provide some minimal level of constraints in office, albeit much less direct than
would be the case in the President’s own re-election.
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national constituency, all of which tend to insulate him from the sorts of pressures that
a member of the House of Representatives faces.21
The importance that a president attaches to his historical legacy focuses each
occupant of the office on a quest for leadership. As Terry Moe explains in his analysis
of presidential structure and institutions:
If there is a single driving force that motivates all presidents, it
is not popularity with the constituency, nor even governance per
se. It is leadership. Above all else, the public wants presidents to
be strong leaders, and presidents know that their success in office
and place in history hinge on the extent to which citizens, politi-
cal elites, academics, and journalists see them as fulfilling these
lofty expectations.22
There are various barometers of presidential leadership, including: the President’s
handling of the domestic and foreign agenda, overall effectiveness of administration,
management of political popularity and political capital towards favored ends, as well
as a range of other strategies aimed at overcoming political obstacles.23
Recently, research within the schools of new institutionalism and historical insti-
tutionalism in political science has sharpened the focus by positing an almost archi-
tectonic leadership task for all presidents: the charting of new paths for American
politics. New institutionalist Terry M. Moe defines this leadership role as
hav[ing] the capacity for rising above politics when necessary,
for pursuing their own vision in the face of political odds, for doing
what is right and best rather than what is politically safe and expe-
dient. Strong leaders have to demonstrate their true metal by being
selectively unresponsive—by being autonomous.24
Similarly, for historical institutionalist Stephen Skowronek, the “presidency is a gov-
erning institution inherently hostile to inherited governing arrangements,” imbuing
21 David Mayhew made the classic statement about the Member of Congress’s re-election
incentive. See generally DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION
13–19 (1974).
22 Moe, supra note 16, at 364.
23 For a sample of the ways that other leading political scientists have approached
presidential leadership, see FRED I. GREENSTEIN, THE PRESIDENTIAL DIFFERENCE 1–10 (3d
ed. 2009) (arguing that understanding presidential leadership requires considering “each chief
executive on his own terms”); SAMUEL KERNELL, GOING PUBLIC: NEW STRATEGIES OF
PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP 1–47 (4th ed. 2007) (arguing that the mark of modern presidential
leadership is in the tendency of presidents since Theodore Roosevelt to appeal directly to the
American public); RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 29–35 (1960) (arguing that
“presidential power is the power to persuade”).
24 Moe, supra note 16, at 364.
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the office with a seemingly innate order-shattering orientation.25 He describes presi-
dential leadership as “an effort to resolve the disruptive consequences of executive
action in the reproduction of legitimate political order,” adding that the President’s
efforts to break new ground within a given historical context links the “assertion of
presidential control to the disruption of past patterns of control.”26 Presidents cannot
help but lead in new directions by discrediting the work of their predecessors.
The institutional capacities of the office certainly enable presidents to exercise
political authority in the ways described by Moe and Skowronek respectively. The
implicit assumption in their work is that presidents retain choice over their ends.27
Although presidents inherit a national political infrastructure full of commitments
from past administrations and coalitional entities, they retain enough autonomy to
fill the available choice space with the priorities of their own administrations.28 As a
result, presidents provide the substantive meaning to the opportunities for leadership
through their choices for the nation. This is consistent with the public regard for pres-
idential accomplishments previously mentioned: Lincoln led the nation through the
Civil War and ended slavery; FDR ushered in the New Deal and the modern admin-
istrative state. Moreover, as presidents are first-movers in initiating new and clear
directions for the nation, rival institutional actors have to respond to their substantive
political visions. Therefore, presidents are charged with the task of steering their sub-
stantive policy commitments and priorities through an array of obstacles—finding
an appropriate means to do so is at the center of their leadership efforts.29
This institutional orientation towards leadership tends to push presidents to seek
ways of controlling their political environment.30 This strategy serves as a means of
25 SKOWRONEK, supra note 4, at 20.
26 Id. at 19.
27 Moe’s and Skowronek’s respective analyses further shifted presidential scholarship away
from behavioral accounts (which were influenced by Richard Neustadt’s Presidential Power,
supra note 23), as well as psychological profiles of the occupants in office (which made sys-
tematic assessments of the Presidency more burdensome and unwieldy).
28 In the famous words of James K. Polk, who stated, “I intend myself to be President,”
every occupant of the office—no matter how constrained by countervailing political forces—
has sufficient institutional powers and incentives to make an impact on the political scene.
See Robert W. Johannsen, Who is James K. Polk? The Enigma of our Eleventh President,
RUTHERFORD B. HAYES PRESIDENTIAL CENTER (Feb. 14, 1999), http://www.rbhayes.org/hayes
/scholarworks/display.asp?id=502.
29 See, e.g., SIDNEY M. MILKIS & MICHAEL NELSON, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY (4th
ed. 2003) (surveying the institutional history of the presidency from George Washington to
George W. Bush); NEUSTADT, supra note 23, at 29–49 (discussing Truman’s dealing with the
obstacles presented by the steel mill crisis, the dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur, and the
implementation of the Marshall Plan); RICHARD M. PIOUS, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 1–9
(1979) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of taking political action in an office that
is both deeply venerated and closely scrutinized).
30 The insights derived from new institutionalism tend to show that the presidential
incentives associated with the building of political structures can be extended to cover the
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securing their historical legacy. Presidents, like other institutional actors in government,
want to exercise public authority.31 They are better positioned in this struggle against
institutional rivals, but they still have to contend with a high number of uncertainties
in governing vis-à-vis these other players. Moe’s analysis of the politics of structural
choice provides a useful baseline on which to build the intuition for presidential for-
ays into constitutional politics.32 The pluralistic nature of American politics invites
rival interests to engage in a struggle to control and exercise political authority, as
Moe elaborates,
The struggle arises because public authority does not belong to
anyone and because whoever wins hold of it has the right to make
law for everyone. The winners can legitimately promote their own
interests through policies and structures of their own design, and
the losers can be forced by law to accept outcomes that make
them absolutely worse off. The power of public authority, then, is
essentially coercive and redistributive. This is why political ac-
tors value it so much—and at the same time, fear it.
. . . 
. . . Political structures belong to whoever happens to be in
authority, and tomorrow some other group with opposing inter-
ests may gain control. They would then become the new “owners”
and have the legal right to destroy or undermine what the first
group had created (without paying any compensation whatever).33
Presidents understand that political uncertainty provides an obstacle to their
leadership efforts, but more importantly, it undermines their long-term ambitions to-
wards constructing a historical legacy. If rival institutional players, such as Congress,
the Supreme Court, or oppositional political interest groups, can undo their political
commitments, then their efforts at constructing a lasting legacy can be severely com-
promised. Presidents seek to minimize these threats whenever possible with structures
that can protect their most important political commitments from the designs of rival
even more ambitious project of constructing a constitutional regime. These insights are also
consistent with the main currents of historical institutionalism within presidential studies and
public law.
31 Moe, supra note 16, at 358–59.
32 Id.; see also Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral
Action, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 132–79 (1999) (arguing that the “notion of the personal pres-
idency” needed to give way to a more formal basis for understanding presidential power).
33 Moe, supra note 16, at 358–59; see also JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION
9 (2011) (noting a similar phenomenon within the context of constitutions).
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interests. They want to constrain the political terrain of their opponents now and in
the future to the greatest extent possible. However, because the fight for public author-
ity is ongoing and inclusive of new entrants—much like E.E. Schattschneider once
described in his 1960 classic The Semisovereign People34—the task of building struc-
tures that securely insulate their agenda from political opponents is arduous, timely,
and costly. Even the best political structures are subject to change over time as per-
sonalities and circumstances tear at their edges. But presidents will continue to engage
in such ambitious political endeavors because it promises the best option for preserv-
ing their political commitments well into the future.
In fashioning structures that protect their programs from the uncertainties asso-
ciated with public authority, presidents will reduce both their “enemies’ opportunities
for future control” and their own, but Moe explains that “this is often a reasonable
price to pay, given the alternative.”35 For Moe, standard principal-agent models of
delegation provide the types of trade-offs made between executive control and ad-
ministrative expertise, rules, and discretion.36 Therefore, he reinterprets this tactic
as “really not giving up control,” but rather as exercising “a greater measure of it ex
ante, through insulated structures that, once locked in, predispose the agency to do the
right things.”37 Although Moe discusses these actions through the President’s strug-
gles over bureaucratic control, his insights are equally applicable to what occurs on
the constitutional level.
II. THE PURSUIT AND CONSTRUCTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REGIME
The idea of “locking-in” political commitments over time has a range of impli-
cations when appropriated to the realm of constitutional politics. Political actors will
want to protect their legacies or commitments whenever possible by the strongest
means available. Presidents do this routinely by politicizing positions of power inside
the federal bureaucracy with reliable ideological allies, while centralizing the centers
of decision-making authority through trusted loyalists.38 In other words, presidents
build political structures designed to achieve a set of desired ends. The same princi-
ples apply to constitutional politics. The only difference here is that the President
34 See generally E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE (1960) (discussing
the continual process of change in and dynamic nature of American politics).
35 Moe, supra note 16, at 359.
36 See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739,
758–61 (1984) (comparing the level of delegation possible with trash collection to the exec-
utive control necessary over policing); see also PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECO-
NOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT (1992); J. Bendor et al., Theories of Delegation,
4 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 235 (2001) (applying game theory to legislative-executive and intra-
institutional delegation).
37 Moe, supra note 16, at 359–60.
38 Id. at 379.
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aims for the strongest form of security available in American politics: constitutional
entrenchment. This means that the President’s political ends will be secured through
the Constitution by making them part of the nation’s higher law, either through
amendment (or a series of amendments), constitutional constructions, or judicial in-
terpretations. Once political preferences gain constitutional recognition by institu-
tional actors—especially constitutional protection by and from the judiciary—much
of the political becomes legal. Therefore, the Constitution protects political prefer-
ences by recognizing them as something akin to higher law. These constitutional in-
novations may be subject to change at some future point, but the obstacles to changing
such baselines are considerable. For this reason, these ambitious attempts to lock-in po-
litical commitments through constitutionalism are very rare, but once they are triggered
and implemented, they become an entrenched part of the constitutional landscape.39
The typical statute, code, or regulation passed by Congress does not achieve this de-
gree of protection because it can be modified or even eradicated completely by the
next set of governing officials. Neither does the lesser authority of a president’s
executive orders, which can be reversed by the next administration. And even the
concept of a legislative “super-statute,” proposed by John Ferejohn and William
Eskridge—requiring more than a mere majority to change certain laws—fails to
provide the heightened level of protection that the constitutionalization strategy dis-
cussed herein offers.40
Constitutionalization, then, should be understood as the institutionalization of
political ends by incorporating them as part of the constitutional law and in certain
cases, the construction of a new constitutional regime. If successfully constructed,
constitutional regimes provide presidents with the ultimate way of “locking-in” polit-
ical commitments from the designs of rival political actors, institutions, or future coa-
litions. Bruce Ackerman defines a constitutional regime as “the matrix of institutional
relationships and fundamental values that are usually taken as the constitutional base-
line in normal political life.”41 Likewise, Keith Whittington writes, “These webs of
institutional, ideological, and partisan commitments form a basic context within which
presidents operate, help structure their strategic options, and provide a first cut on
the set of constraints and opportunities facing a given political leader.”42 John Ferejohn
has applied this concept to a number of different contexts, recognizing its utility as
39 Because the Constitution defines the political bounds of the American polity—a notion
inherent in the very idea of constitutionalism—the newly formed constitutional baselines define
and limit the operational norms of political life.
40 For a thorough and insightful discussion of super-statutes, see William N. Eskridge, Jr.
& John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215 (2001). In this law review article,
Eskridge and Ferejohn characterize a super-statute as an ordinary statute whose effort “to estab-
lish a new normative or institutional framework . . . ‘stick[s]’ in the public culture” and has
“a broad effect on the law.” Id. at 1216.
41 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 59.
42 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 22 (2007).
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a background condition in describing judicial “interpretive regimes.”43 Constitutional
regimes realign constitutional baselines in much the same way that political party
realignments rearrange partisan preferences, only on a much grander scale and at a
deeper foundational level.44 Once a constitutional regime is in place, it forms the dom-
inant understanding of the Constitution—or its constitutional baseline—for a sus-
tained period of time, constraining the policy options available to political players.45
In other words, constitutional regimes form the playing field—the applicable dimen-
sions, boundaries, and yardsticks—from which the game of American politics can
be played.
Because the Constitution is susceptible to political interpretation in terms of its
substantive meaning, emphasis, and points of inflection, presidents seeking to ensure
their agenda for the foreseeable future—given the right set of circumstances—can
attempt to manipulate it. Constitutional regimes are ambitious projects constructed
by presidents, who by the nature of their office, attempt to politically define these con-
stitutional boundaries with their policy priorities. In other words, a well-positioned
president can best protect his political agenda by constitutionalizing it in whole or in
part. Both the incentives and payoffs are higher for a president seeking to constitu-
tionalize his political vision beyond the policy level associated with normal politics.
Unlike bureaucratic structures, which tend to change gradually with every new admin-
istration, constitutional regimes provide far greater security for presidents in terms of
durability and clarity.46 Equally important, they speak to a president’s historical leg-
acy in ways that no other structure in government can. This is why the idea of institu-
tionalizing his political commitments through the Constitution tends to be too enticing
for any president to resist. Once a president can equate his political vision with the
constitutional regime itself, he has achieved the ultimate end available to him in
43 See, e.g., John Ferejohn, Law, Legislation, and Positive Political Theory, in MODERN
POLITICAL ECONOMY 191, 205–07 (Jeffrey S. Banks & Eric A. Hanushek eds., 1995); see
also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Politics, Interpretation, and the Rule of Law,
in THE RULE OF LAW 265, 268 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994).
44 Classic examples of this realignment subgenre include: DAVID W. BRADY, CRITICAL
ELECTIONS AND CONGRESSIONAL POLICY MAKING (1988); WALTER DEAN BURNHAM,
CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 10 (1970); JAMES L.
SUNDQUIST, DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM (1973); V. O. Key, Jr., A Theory of Critical
Elections, 17 J. POL. 3 (1955). For a sustained critique of the realignment thesis, see DAVID
R. MAYHEW, ELECTORAL REALIGNMENTS: A CRITIQUE OF AN AMERICAN GENRE (2002).
45 Constitutional regimes are functionally synonymous in practice, for all intents and
purposes, with the idea of constitutional baselines.
46 One of the problems that all modern presidents confront is the possibility of having a
bureaucracy that tends to reflect the political attitudes and preferences of the agencies they
comprise rather than presidential directives. See Kenneth John Meier & Lloyd G. Nigro,
Representative Bureaucracy and Policy Preferences: A Study in the Attitudes of Federal
Executives, 36 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 458 (1976) (arguing that agency affiliation is stronger than
social origins in predicting policy attitudes).
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American politics: preserving his political vision well beyond his own presidency.
At the same time, he will have constrained the political options available to his imme-
diate successors and oppositional interests.47
Unfortunately for most presidents, the construction of a constitutional regime
comprises the most difficult—and therefore one of the most rare—achievements in
American politics due to its extensive nature and its foundational impact. Presidents
will attempt to constitutionalize a given set of political commitments only under the
most fortuitous political conditions. Most presidents never get the opportunity to even
consider the construction of a constitutional regime; the chances to equate substan-
tive portions of their political agenda with constitutional law are few and far between.
Presidents tend to think strategically about constitutional commitments, but will only
do so in an authoritative manner when given an opportunity.
It should be noted that presidents have an array of powers available to them that
they can employ within constitutional politics, yet these do not relate to the strategy
of constitutionalization noted here. For example, presidents can lend their public sup-
port for proposed amendments to the Constitution. Presidents can appoint Justices
to the Supreme Court and judges to the lower federal courts. They can veto legislation.
They can issue presidential pardons. They can send American forces into battle in
their role as Commander-in-Chief. Likewise, they can declare neutrality, executive
privilege, and on occasion, can even exercise something approaching an effective
prerogative power, particularly during times of crisis or national emergency.48 Pres-
idents can also take unilateral actions at their own discretion where the absence of
legal directives enables them to proceed in ways that can significantly extend the reach
of normal executive authority.49 Certainly, these all count as presidential forays into
constitutional politics because they involve the use of formal constitutional authority
towards the attainment of political ends. They also gain notice and recognition from
other political actors and institutions as constitutional maneuvers. Taken alone, how-
ever, they are not included in the idea of constitutionalization provided here other
than as a set of formal powers available to the president in his hopes of institutionalizing
his political agenda. The fact that the President employs formal authority—under
47 It will also constrain the federal bureaucracy to some extent. However, there are
difficulties here over the long run due to the administrative expertise, longevity, and political
preferences and attitudes that civil servants tend to exercise. This is why most presidents tend
to employ Terry Moe’s dual strategy of politicizing and centralizing the bureaucracy as a means
of reducing agency costs. See Moe, supra note 16, at 365–67 (comparing the organizational
structures of the Presidency to those of Congress, which “minimize the transaction costs of
political exchange”).
48 See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 3–21
(2008) (discussing the philosophical foundations of a unitary theory of executive power and its
development over time, as well as other attendant powers that American presidents have wielded
with regards to their role as executives).
49 Moe, supra note 16, at 366 (referring here to the idea of a president’s “residual decision
rights” derived from economists Grossman and Hart in 1986).
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Article II or otherwise—does not necessarily mean that he is constitutionalizing his
political vision. The President can use formal, as well as informal powers, to constitu-
tionalize his agenda. The President’s ultimate ambitions and concerted actions towards
constructing a distinctive constitutional regime matter more here than the specific
means used to achieve them.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL TIME AND RECONSTRUCTIVE PRESIDENTS
One of the main functions of the U.S. Constitution is that it establishes a foun-
dational baseline setting the rule of law in place, which simultaneously lowers the
stakes of politics within the regime. Because constitutional baselines do not change
frequently, this function of stability serves as one of its most attractive features.
However, there are times when the Constitution adapts to historical exigencies that
threaten its viability whether in fact or in popular perception. Therefore, the Constitu-
tion only invites change on an as needed basis.50 Very few presidents find themselves
even able to consider the construction of a constitutional regime. Most presidents
encounter a normal constitutional baseline upon taking office in which the regime
is fairly stable and any constitutional questions subside to the background as second-
ary preoccupations at best.51 Constitutional questions do not take center stage for
most presidents, as the public tends to relate their performance to national policy goals
associated with the economy, foreign affairs, and perhaps to a lesser extent, social wel-
fare and cultural issues. These immediate political concerns are more manageable
and more apparent to the public, even though the full impact of a president’s handling
of the economy or foreign policy may not be assessable until years later. Nevertheless,
presidents get credit for their leadership skills and even the appearance of action in
these policy areas may be an effective substitute for actual policy at times—the same
way that members of Congress attempt to claim credit for simply taking a position
on an issue regardless of its actual effects on policy outcomes.52 Presidents can adopt
more focused strategies for these immediate political concerns than they can for the
more ambitious undertakings associated with constitutional reconstructions. Presi-
dents tend to be strategic calculators of interest even when they are ideologically
committed to forging new directions for the nation. In other words, they will make
strategic calculations that attempt to effectuate their long-term ambitions. However,
50 Here, the term “as needed” refers to the public perception at the time, whether formed
authentically or constructed by elected representatives, not necessarily in some ontological
sense that the Constitution actually needs to be changed.
51 As a normative matter, this is a beneficial aspect of American constitutionalism because
it speaks to the broad acceptance and operation of the rule of law. As foundational law, the
U.S. Constitution provides a reliable marker that individuals can count on to order their future
actions and assess prospective policies from lawmakers.
52 David Mayhew draws an explicit legislative parallel of this strategy by demonstrating the
ability of members of Congress to take credit for simply taking a position on an issue, which
may earn them political capital from their constituents—perhaps even as much as if they actu-
ally fixed the problems. See MAYHEW, supra note 21, at 61–73.
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these tend to fall short of rearranging constitutional baselines. For example, Presidents
Theodore Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson, respectively, forged new directions within
their time in office without ever seriously challenging the established constitutional
regime they each inherited.53 Although they both wielded the powers of the presidency
in a strong (and often quite ideological) manner, neither one of them had the oppor-
tunity to construct a new constitutional regime different from the one that Abraham
Lincoln constructed (for Theodore Roosevelt’s time in office) nor that which Franklin
Roosevelt constructed (for Lyndon Johnson’s time in office). Aside from the fact that
Lyndon Johnson (and perhaps Theodore Roosevelt) may not have had the sufficient
inclination to change this direction, neither president would have had the authority
to do so even if he had the requisite desire.54
The difficulty associated with engaging in constitutional politics highlights the
fact that while presidents have autonomy in office over policy and administrative deci-
sions, there are contextual limits on their ability to govern in a truly transformative ca-
pacity. Standard rational choice incentives inform presidential objectives to the point
that most would want to constitutionalize their political agenda if given the opportunity.
Their historical legacy would gain the ultimate form of security available in Ameri-
can politics.55 However, they are limited in discrete ways by their own historical cir-
cumstances, and therefore do not waste time or resources engaging in fruitless political
endeavors.56 It is not in their self-interest to do so, especially when more attainable
goals are well within reach.
On rare occasion, the constitutional space will open sufficiently enough for the
president to fill it with his substantive vision, but the circumstances have to be nearly
ideal. The Constitution does not call upon presidents to rearrange its baselines arbi-
trarily; it only becomes contested under the most extraordinary of circumstances.57
53  See infra notes 211–16 and accompanying text.
54 Theodore Roosevelt’s case is certainly arguable and susceptible to interpretation here
since his Progressive vision certainly clashed with Lincoln’s classical liberalism on various lev-
els. However, Stephen Skowronek treats him as an articulation president within his presidential
typology of leadership types, which means that he would have been leading Lincoln’s basic
Republican commitments through new contexts and changing circumstances. The “articulation
president” within Skowronek’s model is described as the orthodox innovator who attempts
to extend the policies of the reconstruction into the politics of the day. See SKOWRONEK, supra
note 4, at 232. Because they do not retain the warrants for reconstructing the regime, they must
operate within constrained political environments. Skowronek explicitly describes Theodore
Roosevelt in this context and devotes a chapter of his book in doing so. See id. at 228–59. But
see GEORGE THOMAS, THE MADISONIAN CONSTITUTION 65–93 (2008) (describing Roosevelt’s
draw on Lincoln’s example as stemming from a more Hamiltonian view of the Constitution
in line with John Marshall’s “notion of ‘inherent power’”).
55 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
56 The scarcity of political capital confines the actions of a unitary actor like the President.
57 This has generally been considered a positive aspect of American constitutionalism, as
unstable or dysfunctional constitutional regimes typically need to be changed more frequently
than a properly functioning one.
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It is constitutional time that leads presidents—and the public—to question the viability
of the system in place. They view the constitutional baselines in place as inadequate
for the times and in need of substantive reform. The threshold for reform, however,
surpasses the call for mere legislation and instead shifts towards a more fundamental
reconsideration of first principles. The questions presidents ask during such periods
run along the following lines: Is the Constitution able to address the changed circum-
stances in the nation? Does the Constitution need to be changed or merely reinter-
preted? What parts of the Constitution need to be emphasized or recovered at this
stage? How do we save the Constitution from its subversion by our predecessors, fu-
ture successors, and political opponents? How do we recover the true principles of
the Constitution? These types of questions assume the inability of the constitutional
regime in place to handle the newly changed contexts, and therefore implicate the
need for some kind of foundational reform. These questions occur during constitu-
tional time: at moments of unsettled understandings as the historical context opens
new interstices for the possible construction of constitutional meaning. In other words,
constitutional time offers an opportunity for an element of creativity in construing con-
stitutional meaning.58 As a result, the reforms presidents invoke often push against
the outer boundaries of the Constitution or even exceed it, as the amendment process
explicitly recognizes.59
A. Constitutional Time and the New Order
In The Politics Presidents Make, Stephen Skowronek introduced the idea of
political time through the concept of reconstructive authority, which matches presi-
dential ambitions with ideal timing.60 Presidential authority is construed from the
interaction of formal power and historical context, meaning that it is not fixed but de-
pendent on exogenous factors beyond a president’s immediate control.61 Presidential
leadership is influenced by a president’s order within the political regime, favoring
some presidents’ political authority while limiting others.62 In other words, something
58 See discussion infra Part III.A.
59 Some legal scholars have posited that the Constitution offers other avenues apart from
the Constitution’s Article V process for amendment as possible alternatives. The argument here
posits that Article V is not the exclusive means of amending the Constitution, as certain landmark
Supreme Court cases can effectuate the same sorts of changes. Although this theory is contro-
versial, it does have its share of supporters and may gain some empirical support from the New
Deal example, where the Supreme Court’s decisions marked a substantive change that affected
the development of constitutional law significantly to the present. See, e.g., 1 ACKERMAN,
supra note 1, at 47–52 (comparing the Supreme Court’s shifting view of the Constitution during
the New Deal to the more direct lawmaking that took place during Reconstruction).
60 See SKOWRONEK, supra note 4, at 36.
61 See id.
62 See id. at 33–41 (identifying four political climates that tend to lend incoming presidents
very different degrees of constraint).
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analogous to the idea that “not all presidents take the same exam while in office” is
at work. Presidents who are conveniently positioned to wield reconstructive authority
come into office when the warrants for the prior regime are weak or collapsing due
to some combination of newly changed political conditions or coalitional disintegra-
tion caused by a triggering event.63
Reconstructive presidents amplify their power to its furthest reaches by accen-
tuating their national policy commitments when the old regime’s vision has been
discredited.64 Under certain conditions, it is possible for presidents to shatter the re-
maining vestiges of the discredited political regime by “articulating the foundations
of the new one.”65 Since reconstructive presidents’ enhanced political authority comes
at the expense of their predecessors in office, they maintain an inverse—and often
adverse—relationship to the prior political regime. The legitimacy of the reconstruc-
tive stance is not necessarily due to the superiority of new presidents’ substantive
vision, but rather is due to their oppositional relation to the status quo (as represented
by the prior regime).66 Therefore, presidents’ natural inclination to lead the nation in
a new—and quite different—direction is significantly enhanced and broadened during
such periods.
Reconstructive presidents are focused upon the task of establishing their own
substantive vision of the constitutional order.67 This is inherent in their leadership task
carried out to its maximum aspirations. Reconstructive presidents equate their po-
litical vision with the higher law, and therefore legalize the political by promoting
a substantive political interpretation of the Constitution. Presidents are institutionally
advantaged in this endeavor by the nature and orientation of the office, especially
when historical context provides them with the added institutional resources at the
far edges of their authority, including the rarely invoked claims of departmentalism.68
Alexis de Tocqueville made a somewhat analogous observation about this in the 1830s,
noting, “There is almost no political question in the United States that is not resolved
sooner or later into a judicial question. Hence the obligation under which the parties
63 Id. at 36–39.
64 Although Skowronek and many other presidential scholars proceed from the assumption
that the modern presidency—especially under the stronger presidents—has drifted substantially
from the Founders’ original intentions, I argue that the reconstructive stance was an intentional
product of the constitutional design, not a random development that deviated from the modest
origins of the presidency. See Richard Alexander Izquierdo, The American Presidency and the
Logic of Constitutional Renewal: Pricing in Institutions and Historical Context from the
Beginning, 28 J.L. & POL. 273, 273–74 (2013).
65 WHITTINGTON, supra note 42, at 23.
66 See, e.g., GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE
RISE AND FALL OF GENERATIONAL REGIMES 20–47 (2007) (noting that President Jackson was
antagonistic towards the Native tribes forcing them to move westward due to the confluence
of his political interests and constitutional vision).
67 WHITTINGTON, supra note 42, at 53.
68 See discussion infra Part III.B.
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find themselves in their daily polemics to borrow from the ideas and language of
justice.”69 Their quest to construct a lasting historical legacy against future successors
and political rivals provides insight as to why presidents would even consider engaging
in such ambitious, risky endeavors in the first place.70
Presidents who were able to create and maintain the most extensive and durable
regimes were the ones who faced the greatest threats to the regime while in office:
the initial years following the American Founding, the American Civil War, and the
Great Depression. These three periods arguably qualify as the most extraordinary
times in American history, and therefore serve as the most far-reaching examples of
extraordinary politics experienced by any president in office.71 The presidencies of
George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt—having presided
over these three periods, respectively—constructed the most durable constitutional
69 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 257–58 (Harvey C. Mansfield
& Delba Winthrop eds., trans., 2000).
70 Accounting for the purpose and incentive structure of the executive in relation to ex-
traordinary historical triggers provides the necessary foundations for accessing the President’s
role in constitutional change and renewal.
71 In his three-volume series, Bruce Ackerman treats the American Founding, Recon-
struction, the Great Depression, and more recently, the Civil Rights Movement, as the only sig-
nificant periods in American history where the nation experienced a constitutional moment
signaling a deliberate shift in foundational priorities and higher lawmaking. 1 ACKERMAN,
supra note 1, at 58–59; see also 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 8; 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 3.
While Ackerman’s approach is useful, it is modified here in two ways. Firstly, two of the three
constitutional moments he addresses are emphasized differently. Rather than dwelling on the
politics of the Constitutional Convention and the possible illegalities of the original Con-
stitution’s adoption, this Article focuses on the political entrenchment of the first constitu-
tional regime by the Washington Administration. The move away from Madison and towards
Washington here is consistent with the emphasis on the political dimensions of constitutional
construction and the maintenance undertaken by reconstructive presidents throughout history.
In discussing the American Civil War, Ackerman incorporates both Lincoln’s presidential
leadership in pushing through the Thirteenth Amendment outlawing slavery, as well as the
radical Republicans’ congressional push through questionable obedience—or more likely
disobedience—of constitutional formalities in ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment amidst
obstacles posed by a recalcitrant President Johnson and a hostile former Confederacy. 2
ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 120–23. The focus here will be on Lincoln’s punctuation of a
Republican constitutional vision that he considered a completion of the Founders’ original
hopes for the Republic. The treatment of the constitutional moment during the Great Depression
here will emphasize a similar series of historical events as Ackerman’s. Secondly, the analysis
here will include those historical presidencies that Ackerman briefly addresses as “failed con-
stitutional moments” or insufficient constitutional transformations such as the presidencies of
Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, and Ronald Reagan. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 108–13.
It should be noted that Ackerman seems to reconsider some parts of Jefferson’s struggle in his
book THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF
PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 224 (2005) (referencing “the Jeffersonian revolution in constitu-
tional law”). The choice of historical events and triggers is very important to the level of analy-
sis here because it contributes to the understanding of the continuum of constitutional politics.
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regimes through historical opportunities that required their foundational imprint.
The regimes they constructed were authentically theirs in that each of these presidents
chose the substantive meaning of the constitutional moment they inherited. These pres-
idents managed to secure their respective constitutional visions well into the future—
and more securely than any other presidents in American history. However, their
executions were aided considerably by constitutional time. If Presidents Washington,
Lincoln, and Roosevelt were removed from their immediate political environment,
the extent of their constitutional legacy would be diminished proportionally as well.
Once presidents establish a new political regime, the factious nature of American
politics starts to weaken them over time, as changing events, demographics, and op-
positional interests tear at its edges.72 For example, even the New Deal coalition,
which dominated the twentieth century in American politics, showed signs of strain
as early as the 1950s during the Eisenhower years when some parts of the “solid
South” voted Republican at the presidential level for the first time in decades.73 These
pressures only intensified through the 1960s and 1970s as the pieces of the once dom-
inant Democratic coalition began to disintegrate over the cultural and social strug-
gles involving Civil Rights and the Vietnam War, which coincided with the nation’s
growing dissatisfaction towards the perceived excesses of the welfare state.74 By the
time Jimmy Carter was able to cobble together a bare majority from the last remnants
of what was left of the New Deal coalition, a confluence of economic and foreign
policy events converged to end its long-heralded reign with the election of Ronald
Reagan in 1980.75 The New Deal coalition, which once included the broadest
72 See, SKOWRONEK, supra note 4, at 50 (“As a rule, successive regime affiliates will send
ever more serious sectarian schisms through the ranks.”).
73 See Historical Presidential Elections, 270 TO WIN, http://www.27towin.com/historical
-presidential-elections/ (last visited May 1, 2015) (showing that in the 1950s, Louisiana voted
Republican for the first time in eighty years, and Kentucky, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia
voted Republican for the first time in about thirty years).
74 SKOWRONEK, supra note 4, at 361.
75 The demise of the New Deal coalition remains a debated topic among political scientists.
There are some who claim that it ended in 1968 with the election of Richard Nixon. See, e.g.,
MILKIS & NELSON, supra note 29, at 326–29. However, Nixon’s victory only showed that a
“safe” moderate Republican could be elected in a year when the Democrats were badly split
and dispirited—and even then, with only a narrow victory in a three-way race. Id. at 326–27
(discussing Democratic presidential candidate Hubert Humphrey’s weakness). Nixon’s victory
did not spillover to Congress as both the House and Senate remained in the firm control of the
Democratic Party. Id. Moreover, the effects of Watergate gave the Democrats some additional
“borrowed time” in the 1970s, as it enabled them to gain a narrow presidential victory in 1976
after their landslide defeat in 1972 (in which they managed to win only one state, Massachusetts).
See id. at 333–41 (discussing the effects of Watergate, Gerald Ford’s tepid popularity, and
Jimmy Carter’s presidency). It seems that 1980 signaled something different in character from
1968, albeit far less conclusively than Franklin Roosevelt’s sweeping realignment in the 1930s.
When Ronald Reagan was elected president, he won a majority in a three-way race and an elec-
toral landslide over an incumbent president. Presidential Election 1980, ROPER CENTER PUB.
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collection of voters from racial segregationists in the South to committed socialists
in the cities—and many working class and middle class voters in between—could
not keep its structure intact as its conflicting constituencies drifted apart over time.76
Ronald Reagan represented the rhetorical repudiation of the New Deal and con-
sciously attempted to incorporate the style of Franklin Roosevelt towards Conservative
political ends.77 Yet Reagan’s relation to constitutional politics bears a mixed and
rather incomplete legacy, as some scholars have noted that his administration’s
“emphasis on presidential politics and executive administration relegated his admin-
istration to the task of managing—even reinforcing—the state apparatus it was com-
mitted to dismantling.”78 The reconstructive stance is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for the construction of a new constitutional regime.
Constitutionalization is a political phenomenon even more rare than the cyclical
appearance of a political realignment because it attempts to rearrange the foundational
commitments of the regime rather than just the political direction of the nation.79 The
OPINION ARCHIVES, http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/elections/presidential_election_1980
.html (last visited May 1, 2015). Equally important, he carried the Senate for the Republicans
for the first time in twenty-eight years and made considerable gains in the House of Repre-
sentatives. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 390. Unlike Nixon, however, Reagan challenged
the foundations of the New Deal much the same way that Roosevelt challenged the foundations
of the Republican regime in the 1930s. Id. at 389–90. As Stanford University political scientist
David W. Brady would show, the Republicans most likely failed to carry the House of Rep-
resentatives in Reagan’s 1984 re-election with forty-nine states because of the Democrats’
incumbency advantage. See BRADY, supra note 44, at 177–78. Yet the working ideological
House majority that Reagan gained in 1980—in addition to the Republican Senate majority—
enabled Reagan enough political space to change the nation’s political terrain in a way that
Nixon could not. It should be noted that Reagan inherited a political environment in which
partisan affiliation was significantly weaker than it was earlier in the century, thus making par-
tisan shifts more difficult than it may have been. See MILKIS & NELSON, supra note 29, at 327.
Moreover, the triggering events that led to Reagan’s election were milder than those that led
to Roosevelt’s. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 391. While the dispute to the ultimate polit-
ical meaning of the 1980 presidential election will continue, the analysis here will treat it sig-
nificantly different from the 1968 presidential election.
76 See generally MICHAEL BARONE, OUR COUNTRY: THE SHAPING OF AMERICA FROM
ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 383–611 (1990) (discussing the cultural cleavages and tensions that
began to tear apart the New Deal Coalition from the 1960s to the 1980s).
77 Skowronek considers Reagan the most recent reconstructive president, who as a result
of political time, shared more in common with presidents Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson,
Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt than he did with Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter be-
fore him, or George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton after him. See SKOWRONEK, supra note 4,
at 410–17.
78 MARC LANDY & SIDNEY M. MILKIS, PRESIDENTIAL GREATNESS 225 (2000); see also
2 ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 397–98 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s inability to overrule
Roe frustrated President Reagan’s attempt to overturn the New Deal regime).
79 Skowronek’s book only focused on the President’s leadership opportunities in terms of
partisan coalition-building within new political regimes; his emphasis was on political regimes,
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difference is a matter of degree, magnitude, and scope; therefore, constitutional time
differs in degree, magnitude, and scope from Skowronek’s political time.80 Account-
ing for the purpose and incentive structure of the Executive in relation to extraordinary
historical triggers provides the necessary foundations for accessing the President’s
role in constitutional change and renewal. It is necessary to note that reconstructive
presidents are relatively rare in American politics, as only Thomas Jefferson, Andrew
Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, and Ronald Reagan are described
as reconstructive presidents within Skowronek’s typology.81 Some years later, polit-
ical scientists Morris Fiorina and Paul Peterson would add George Washington to
Skowronek’s model of reconstructive presidents by juxtaposing Washington’s presi-
dency against the prior political regime under the Articles of Confederation.82
B. Executing the Constitution
The Constitution is a dynamic document. Reconstructive presidents tend to view
the Constitution this way, which explains why they attempt to construct enduring re-
gimes that can speak to their legacy whenever given an opportunity.83 They attempt
to build constitutional regimes through a number of methods, including the controver-
sial invocation of departmentalism, constitutional constructions, and creations. These
elaborate, extend, or modify constitutional meaning. Either the executive or legislative
not constitutional regimes. See SKOWRONEK, supra note 4, at 3–4. Skowronek did not address
the possible constitutional implications of his work except as a background condition for ex-
ploring reconstructive possibilities. See generally id. Yet the strongest presidential ambitions
are foundational, and therefore, the Constitution must enter the picture as both a basic resource
and a constraint. Skowronek’s insights, like Moe’s, are directly applicable for understanding
some of the ways in which presidents interpret their own authority, especially the ones who do
so under fortuitous historical conditions. Moreover, an extension of Skowronek’s political time
idea to the constitutional realm reestablishes the inextricable link between institutions and
historical context imbedded in executive power, dating back to the Founders’ creation of the
Article II presidency.
80 See, e.g., MAGLIOCCA, supra note 66, at 2–14 (arguing that “the evolution of constitutional
attitudes” is largely determined by “regular clashes between ‘constitutional generations’”).
81 See SKOWRONEK, supra note 4, at 33.
82 See MORRIS P. FIORINA ET AL., THE NEW AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 381 (5th ed. 2007).
In their chart of reconstructive and disjunctive leaders, Fiorina and Peterson had the option of
replacing the Articles of Confederation as the “disjunctive leader” with any of the actual pres-
idents under the Articles. The office was so weak that one of its more famous occupants, John
Hancock, never even bothered to accept the position. Again, this tends to show the type of office
that the new presidency under the 1787 Constitution was designed to effectuate, particularly
considering the struggles of the 1780s.
83 If Alexander Hamilton’s expectation in Federalist 78 that judges would merely find the
law and apply it to cases seems insufficient as an empirical explanation, it is because American
constitutionalism has been given content by political actors. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at
469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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branches can engage in these actions, but it is usually presidents who tend to initiate
them with an eye towards the new regime.84 Collectively, they enable scholars to get
beyond the idea of the Constitution as constitutional law, and to instead acknowledge
that specific constitutional meaning emerges through a synthesis of legal doctrines,
institutional practices, normative sensibilities, and political context.85
1. Departmentalism
The theory and practice of departmentalism or coordinate review refers to the
idea that each branch can independently interpret the Constitution for itself, and can-
not be bound by the interpretations of a rival branch, including the judiciary.86 This
theory of interpretative plurality allows the natural tension between the branches to play
out, opposing the notion of judicial supremacy, understood as the idea that the judi-
cial branch has the final, binding determination on matters requiring constitutional
interpretation. As a result, presidents making departmentalist claims have asserted the
authority to ignore the Supreme Court’s constitutional reasoning and have acted upon
their own independent judgments.87 These reconstructive leaders have been able to
challenge the Court’s substantive vision of the Constitution, tending to support the
notion that the presidential invocation of departmentalism is implicit in the recon-
structive stance: it functions as a means available to achieve constitutional ends.88
84 The obvious exception would be the Republican Congress’s support for the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868 over Democratic president Andrew Johnson’s objections to it. However,
the substantive provisions of the amendment were thoroughly consistent with Lincoln’s
constitutional vision. See THOMAS, supra note 54, at 39–44.
85 See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 2–3 (1999).
86 See ROBERT SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESIDENCY 23–51 (1971)
(examining the executive-judicial conflicts arising under Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson,
Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt); Steven G. Calabresi, Caesarism, Departmentalism,
and Professor Paulsen, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1422 (1999) (arguing that the “essence of the
Departmentalist position” is that the Constitution does not give “either the Courts or any other
branch of the federal government the power to enforce or interpret the Constitution”); Frank
H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 905–06 (1989–90)
(examining the constitutionality and scope of the executive branch’s power to interpret the law);
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive
Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81, 83 (1993) (arguing that the “premises of exec-
utive branch interpretive autonomy and of judicial supremacy are . . . irreconcilable” and that
they may both represent a “pure legal-realist concession made on grounds of pragmatism”); see
also SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 9–53 (1988) (surveying the range of rev-
erential attitudes toward the Constitution among several Founders).
87 The list of presidents who have adopted such a stance is a familiar one, and includes
Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt. SCIGLIANO,
supra note 86, at 23.
88 In fact, all reconstructive presidents have been departmentalists, as the foundational
nature of the changes they have sought required extraordinary means to effectuate them. See 
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In constructing a particular Madisonian approach to the Constitution, George Thomas
argues that conflicting interpretations foster the nation’s positive constitutional commit-
ments and “are thus fundamental in bringing the Constitution to life and are different,
in kind, from the Court’s.”89
During constitutional time, constitutional space becomes available to new in-
terpretations that reflect the changed political conditions that political actors must
address. The judiciary’s skills at technical interpretations of the law, which involve
routine, incremental extensions of logic, seem outdated and inappropriate during such
periods.90 Keith Whittington argues that the Court’s claims to exclusive interpretive
authority seem misplaced when the national focus turns to the “‘constitutional base-
line’ itself,” as judicial supremacy becomes more tenuous whenever political actors
can make strong claims to read the Constitution for themselves.91 Reconstructive pres-
idents battle the Court for constitutional space, and in these special instances, they
tend to prevail. During these extraordinary periods, the President displaces the Court
as the nation’s dominant constitutional actor.92 Thus, there exists an inverse institu-
tional relationship between the executive and judicial branches. The Court’s authority
to settle disputed constitutional meaning wanes as the President’s authority to recon-
struct the inherited constitutional order heightens.93
Reconstructive presidents do not seek to challenge the Supreme Court or any other
institution per se during constitutional time. The dynamics at work between the pres-
idency and judiciary go beyond the given institutional conflicts imbedded in the notion
that ambition will counteract ambition in Federalist 51.94 Instead, presidents seek to
occupy the available constitutional space because they want to ensure that their pre-
ferred constitutional vision sustains itself well past their time in office as their enduring
legacy. Presidents tend to politicize constitutional meaning and challenge the Supreme
Court’s authority to determine what the law is by promoting a contested view of the
Constitution.95 Whittington discusses this phenomenon in some detail by noting,
Whereas the judiciary usually emphasizes the constitutional
constraints on government power, reconstructive presidents draw
inspiration from the Constitution for their positive vision of how
WHITTINGTON, supra note 42, at 53 (“Departmentalism is implicit in the reconstructive
posture . . . .”).
89 THOMAS, supra note 54, at 21.
90 Similarly, Whittington notes that the “assertion of ‘judicial omniscience in the interpre-
tation of the Constitution’ will itself seem quite arrogant and shocking to political leaders who
sought and gained power in order to advance radically different constitutional understandings.”
WHITTINGTON, supra note 42, at 52.
91 Id. at 22.
92 Id. at 15–17.
93 Id. at 18–21.
94 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
95 WHITTINGTON, supra note 42, at 76–81.
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political power should be used. In presidential hands, the Consti-
tution becomes an ideal to be realized in political practice rather
than a set of rules that hamper political action. The symbol of the
Constitution is employed to legitimate presidential actions. The
policies of the administration are portrayed as not merely consis-
tent with but as products of the Constitution. As architects of
fundamental political change, reconstructive presidents appeal to
the Constitution to help legitimate their enterprise. The substantive
vision of the Constitution that these presidents offer is explicitly
different from the interpretations and practices of their immedi-
ate predecessors, but these presidents insist that theirs is an effort
to save the Constitution from the mishandling of their immediate
predecessors and the Court itself.96
Presidents maintain their focus on the success of their substantive constitutional
vision. The rare opportunity to constitutionalize substantive political ends explains
much more of the dynamics at work during these transitional periods than any rival
institutional hostility or distrust.97 Presidents will want to pursue their opportunities for
constitutionalizing their political agenda given a particular set of circumstances, and so
the political opening or constitutional space provided by the circumstances ultimately
dictates constitutional success.98 When faced with the task of constructing a new
96 Id. at 54.
97 Id. (arguing that Thomas Jefferson was motivated primarily by the fear that “the Con-
stitution was being strangled in its cradle,” not by political rivalry).
98 Institutional scholars should not be surprised that constitutional success has more to do
with constitutional time than it does with presidential skill. The structure and design of the
Constitution link and situate presidents this way. Presidents are naturally drawn to the lure of
the constitutional endeavor by the nature of the office—its incentives but also its structural
design within the separation of powers. Presidents want to constitutionalize their priorities and
some fortunate presidents—aided by history—actually get the opportunity to do so. What is
perhaps counterintuitive involves the other half of this equation. While the constitutional space
opened by historical events crowds out the space for autonomous action by reconstructive pres-
idents, the reverse is true for presidents with a more limited constitutional opening. Presidents
constrained by contextual factors must exercise more extensive leadership skills in attempting
any efforts to influence constitutional meaning. Presidents do not come to office labeled recon-
structive or non-reconstructive in their warrants for political authority—as the constitutional
time concept to be employed here is always “backward-looking” to some degree. Yet presi-
dents desire to secure some portion of their legacy beyond that of their successors and poten-
tial rivals. Because nonreconstructive presidents’ openings are smaller, their efforts have to be
much more exacting and tactical—even though their payoffs are irredeemably smaller than
those of reconstructive presidents. However, this contextually constrained group illustrates that
all presidents tend to think constitutionally when given a chance—as well as when not really
given a fair chance. Therefore, nonreconstructive presidents provide the elegance to the model
of constitutional construction in that they show how presidential forays into constitutional pol-
itics exist within a continuum. Presidential leadership is more institutionally creative and, by
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constitutional regime, the actions of reconstructive presidents have been sufficiently
similar: each would capitalize on a given opportunity—to the extent reasonable—in
order to secure a lasting legacy.
2. Constitutional Constructions
Constitutional constructions refer here to the efforts by political actors—but
particularly presidents with regards to new constitutional regimes—to engage in the
“political melding of the document with external interests and principles.”99 In his
book Constitutional Construction, Keith Whittington describes the “defining fea-
tures of constitutional constructions” as resolving “textual indeterminacies” and ad-
dressing “constitutional subject matter.”100 These constructions fill in the gaps within
the interstices of the text and help “transform constitutional theory into constitutional
practice.”101 The need for such constructions arises from the generality associated
with various broad, vague, or amorphous phrases, such as “liberty” in the Due Process
Clause102 or “the executive power” in the Vesting Clause.103 As a result, political actors
must ground these abstract notions within actual rules of law.104
necessity, more entrepreneurial, at the narrowest openings of constitutional space, while it is
least in display—because less necessary—at the level of reconstructive politics where the con-
stitutional space is broadest. Lastly, it suggests that the very idea of presidential leadership at
the level of constitutional construction must be further divided into substantive and strategic
dimensions. At the level of constitutional politics, reconstructive presidents exercise auton-
omy over the substantive content of the new regime being constructed. They decide what the
new constitutional regime will represent at the level of foundations, partisan commitments, and
ideological tendencies. These choices will, in turn, constrain the available choices of policy-
makers and the judiciary within the new regime. However, these same reconstructive presi-
dents can get away with less tactical skill and strategy in fixing their place in constitutional
history, as they have available to them the opportunities that nonreconstructive actors must,
by necessity, try to create for themselves.
99 WHITTINGTON, supra note 85, at 1. Constitutional constructions have been given
substance and clarification by Keith Whittington’s book by the same title, while some rival
scholars have elaborated and modified the thesis since then. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RE-
STORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 118–30 (2004) (“Though the process of constitutional con-
struction fills the gaps within original meaning, I do not share Whittington’s characterization
of the process of construction as ‘political.’”); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Consti-
tutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 458 (2013) (“[T]he actual text of the U.S.
Constitution contains general, abstract, and vague provisions that require constitutional con-
struction for their application to concrete constitutional cases.”).
100 WHITTINGTON, supra note 85, at 9.
101 Id. at 8.
102 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
103 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America.”).
104 See BARNETT, supra note 99, at 122–23.
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President George Washington established the precedent for constitutional con-
structions through his Proclamation of Neutrality in 1793.105 Washington read his
formal authority in foreign affairs broadly and effectively precluded Congress from
declaring war amidst the mounting hostilities between Britain and France across the
Atlantic.106 Less dramatically, President Thomas Jefferson would decide to deliver
his State of the Union through a written message to Congress—a construction fol-
lowed until President Woodrow Wilson revived the practice of personally delivering
the national address over a century later.107 President Abraham Lincoln read the Con-
stitution in a way that refused to recognize the Southern Confederacy’s claims to
secession.108 Both Jefferson and Wilson, respectively, fulfilled their constitutional
requirements through legitimate constitutional constructions; and most scholars be-
lieve that Lincoln’s actions were not only constitutionally permissible and appropri-
ate, but perhaps required to maintain the regime through an extraordinary crisis.109
Lincoln’s consistent defense of the constitutionality of his actions speaks to the fact
that constitutional constructions are not so open-ended that they permit arbitrary
actions.110 The notion of limits is inherent in the concept of constitutionalism—even
within a constitution that is dynamic and responsive to constitutional time. The most
extraordinary of circumstances do not authorize lawless behavior unrestrained from
constitutionality; they merely open the space available for more substantive constitu-
tional input from the political branches, particularly the Presidency.111
Constructions exist within a range.112 The broad constructions by Washington
and Lincoln above were of much greater constitutional significance than the more
specific constructions by Jefferson and Wilson pertaining to the State of the Union.113
105 See Morton J. Frisch, The Significance of the Pacificus-Helvidius Debates: Toward the
Completion of the American Founding, Introduction to ALEXANDER HAMILTON & JAMES
MADISON, THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES OF 1793–1794, vii, vii–viii (Morton J. Frisch
ed., 2007).
106 But see JOHN YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND 88–90 (2009) (summarizing Madison’s
argument that President Washington’s statement did not actually preclude Congress in the
manner commonly cited by scholars).
107 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 85, at 13.
108 See DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 7–25 (2003).
109 See Joseph M. Bessette & Jeffrey Tulis, The Constitution, Politics, and the Presidency,
in THE PRESIDENCY IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 3, 19–22 (Joseph M. Bessette & Jeffrey
Tulis eds., 1981).
110 HARRY V. JAFFA, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM 357–402 (2000) (describing Lincoln’s
defense of his actions).
111 See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 99, at 118–30 (arguing that even the process of con-
stitutional construction should “adher[e] to the formalities governing amendments”); Robert N.
Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of “This Consti-
tution,” 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1264–65 (1987) (discussing the differences between “extra-
constitutional” and “contraconstitutional” constitutional constructions and interpretations).
112 WHITTINGTON, supra note 85, at 16.
113 See id. at 13.
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The types of constructions that affect the construction of constitutional regimes are
generally broad constructions. “A broad construction not only addresses a substan-
tive constitutional issue, resolving a particular question of textual meaning, but also
is productive of additional constructions across other issues[,]” writes Whittington,
adding that “[b]road constructions may be expected to spark more popular interest
and more explicitly constitutional deliberations, while establishing firmer and more
encompassing boundaries for future political debate.”114 Whittington provides an
example of this in the way the Lochner era is known for a single case, “not because
a great deal hinged on whether the due process clause allowed state legislatures to
limit the number of hours bakers might work, but because it was exemplary of an
approach to several constitutional issues.”115 While “[s]ubstantive characteristics
may be affected as well by a construction’s breadth, as a given construction ‘leaks’
across substantive categories and reorients our understanding of multiple constitu-
tional issues[,]” it should be noted that “[o]nly a few constructions rise above such
concerns to reshape the constitutional framework in a substantial way.”116
When the constitutional space opens, presidents will tend to lock-in as much of
their substantive vision as possible, especially since not all of it will become part of
the new constitutional regime. For example, important parts of Franklin Roosevelt’s
constitutional agenda were struck down during his first term, as the Supreme Court
held firm amidst the political juggernaut that the activist New Deal legislation repre-
sented to the constitutional norms in place.117 Therefore, the fact that historical open-
ings are relatively short-lived adds to the various dimensions of uncertainty that
presidents confront during constitutional time. These threats to their legacy include:
the strength of the future coalitions that eventually rise against their newly entrenched
constitutional vision, the competency and willingness of the judiciary to consolidate
it through case law, the persistent existence of state governments hostile to the new
regime, and the constant threat of unforeseen events and new circumstances. For ex-
ample, the constitutional legacy of Lincoln and the congressional Republican Party
was incomplete, as the Supreme Court in the 1870s Slaughter-House Cases118 arguably
114 Id. at 11–13.
115 Id. at 13. For a new account of the Lochner era rulings that challenges some of the
conventional wisdom about its role within American constitutional law, see DAVID E.
BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER (2011).
116 WHITTINGTON, supra note 85, at 13. Whittington notes that “some of the most significant
constructions in [American] history [include] Lincoln’s rejection of the right of secession,
the federal government’s acceptance of responsibility for the country’s macroeconomic per-
formance, or the American rise to the status of a global superpower.” Id. at 16. Although
Whittington does not discuss these instances in depth, each “substantially shaped American
constitutional and political development.” Id.
117 See generally BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT 45–106 (1998);
HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 101–74 (1993); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG,
THE SUPREME COURT REBORN 26–81 (1995).
118 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), abrogated by statute.
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read the provisions of the privileges and immunities clause much more narrowly
than the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment might have preferred.119 For this
reason, the types of constructions that collectively comprise the new constitutional
regime tend to be broad, as presidents tend to take what they can get—and ensure
it against as many contingencies as possible.
3. Creations
Sometimes, the broad constructions that reconstructive presidents prefer may
not be available to them. While constructions can often display an element of crea-
tivity, they are not limitless, and some constitutional arguments may therefore be lo-
cated beyond the bounds of constitutionality. The Constitution itself reflects this
possibility by allowing for amendment through a set of formal features outlined under
Article V.120 Therefore, constructions are complemented by the possibility of consti-
tutional creations, which simply involve the addition of new text to the old, integrating
the new supplemental language as part of the Constitution.121 In this way, the radical
Republicans in Congress, who drafted the Civil War amendments, stand in the same
authoritative position with regard to the Fourteenth Amendment as did James Madison
and the leading Framers of the Constitution in 1787.122 Whittington notes that some-
times “[c]reations may begin as constitutional constructions . . . as the momentum of
a political movement carries it beyond the plausible meaning of the inherited text.”123
This is, in part, what occurred during the Civil War as President Lincoln issued the
Emancipation Proclamation—a construction of his executive powers—that formed the
foundational basis for extending such principles to the states through the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution.124 Moreover, construction
and creation may complement other tactics that presidents can employ within their
general strategy of constitutional regime construction, such as selecting particular
119 See THOMAS, supra note 54, at 40 (noting that the Court interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment in light of antebellum strands of constitutional meaning, thereby thwarting the foun-
dational commitments that the Republican Congress sought to achieve in drafting it); see also
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE 171–76 (1986) (arguing that Justice Samuel
Miller’s opinion “turned the plan for the Fourteenth Amendment on its head”); RONALD M.
LABBÉ & JONATHAN LURIE, THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES 166–78 (abridged ed. 2005) (noting
that Justice Miller found that the Fourteenth Amendment protected only the rights of national,
not state, citizenship, and that the Equal Protection Clause only applied to blacks).
120 See U.S. CONST. art. V.
121 WHITTINGTON, supra note 85, at 4. Whittington also notes that the “potential synchro-
nicity of constitutional interpretation, construction, and creation highlights the difficulty in dis-
tinguishing among them.” Id. at 14.
122 See id. at 4 (“[T]he founders who draft the new text stand in a unique position in the
history of the polity, as their decisions are authoritative.”).
123 Id. at 14.
124 See THOMAS, supra note 54, at 39–62.
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nominees to the Supreme Court or choosing to support certain constitutional arguments
before the Court through the Solicitor General.125
When assessed collectively, constructions and creations involve the most forthright
exposition of a substantive constitutional vision. Yet only historical perspective can
determine the relative success of such actions, as well as clarify the contours of its
contributions to the new constitutional baseline.126 When presidents resort to these
constructions and creations, they are acting consistently with the institutional designs
of the office and the incentive structure built within it. Once the new constitutional
settlement is solidified, the terms and authority of the new baseline are still subject to
political contestation. However, such struggles will favor the newly established
regime unless historical context opens sufficient space for new changes, as constitu-
tional space only opens within periods of historical exigency and political uncer-
tainty. The logic of constitutional renewal centers on the presidency and its ability
to absorb contextual necessity within pools of institutional discretion.
IV. CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL TIME
The idea that constitutional time matters in the construction of constitutional
meaning is best seen through two presidencies that do not get the same amount of
attention from scholars for their constitutional achievements as Presidents Lincoln and
Franklin Roosevelt have. Presidents Washington and Theodore Roosevelt maintain
a relatively minor place in discussions about constitutional legacy. For Washington
this is an oversight, while for Theodore Roosevelt it is not—but for precisely the rea-
sons provided in Parts I, II, and III. Washington certainly used less authority than
he had available as President, yet his placement in constitutional time afforded him
enough space to construct a Federalist Constitution with an orientation towards na-
tional government. Likewise, Theodore Roosevelt should have constructed an enduring
legacy, as he had clear constitutional ambitions and policy preferences on commerce,
judicial deference, and executive power. The fact that he did not is worth noting after
Washington’s in order to emphasize the importance of constitutional time in framing
constitutional meaning.
A. President Washington, First in Constitutional Time
The founding of any nation qualifies as a traumatic event, especially within the
generation that experiences it—a period full of risk and uncertainty, as the new order
establishes itself on the vestiges of the old. The importance of this period in the
United States was further magnified because the nation had established its second
constitutional government within a decade.127 Therefore, the Founding opened up the
125 See generally FARBER, supra note 108.
126 WHITTINGTON, supra note 85, at 14.
127 1 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 69, at 105–07.
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most space for constitutional construction because it was situated upon a blank slate
with two decades worth of historical crises: the Revolutionary War against the world’s
strongest power in the late 1770s; a crisis in constitutional government triggered by
the failures and limitations of the Articles of Confederation throughout the 1780s;
and the high degree of uncertainty associated with the formation of a new govern-
ment under the U.S. Constitution during the late 1780s and throughout the 1790s.128
The Articles of Confederation, which lasted from 1781 to 1787, provided the
baseline of political deficiencies that the new Constitution would need to address.
The thirteen states had formed only a faint semblance of a national government with
which to bring order to the nation under the Articles, creating a “league of friendship”
that could not levy taxes or regulate commerce.129 Nine of thirteen votes were required
128 See id. The American Founding was a continuous process that spanned the period
beginning with the Revolutionary War for Independence and the Declaration of Independence
in the 1770s, included the Articles of Confederation from 1781 to 1787, the subsequent Consti-
tutional Convention in Philadelphia, and the struggles for ratification in the states, and con-
cluded with the swearing in of George Washington as the first U.S. President in New York City
in 1789. See id.
129 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1778, art. III. The lack of national unity and purpose
was evident in the practice of some states “in restricting the commercial intercourse with other
states” for the benefit of local manufacturers and merchants, as James Madison wrote in 1787,
adding that such restrictions tend “to beget retaliating regulations, not less expensive and vex-
atious in themselves than they are destructive of the general harmony.” 1 LETTERS AND OTHER
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 321 (1865). He was referring to the practice of New York,
Maryland, and his home state of Virginia to impose restrictions in favor of vessels belonging
to their own citizens at the expense of the national interest. See id. For example, in retaliation
to New York’s commercial restrictions, New Jersey and Connecticut boycotted their imports—
and New Jersey even refused to comply with the confederated Congress’s requests for contri-
butions until New York had reduced its tariff. JEROME HUYLER, LOCKE IN AMERICA 254 (1995).
Sensing the urgency of the situation, Alexander Hamilton warned, “[w]e may reasonably expect
from the gradual conflicts of State regulations that the citizens of each would at length come
to be considered and treated by the others in no better light than that of foreigners and aliens.”
THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 145 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). He pre-
dicted that “[t]he infractions of these regulations, on one side, the efforts to prevent and repel
them, on the other, would naturally lead to outrages, and these to reprisals and wars.” THE
FEDERALIST NO. 7, at 63 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). In his typical dis-
dain for the actions of state legislatures, Madison wrote to President Washington urging a
national veto as
a negative in all cases whatsoever on the legislative acts of the States,
as heretofore exercised by the Kingly prerogative, appears . . . absolutely
necessary, and . . . the least possible encroachment on the State juris-
dictions. Without this defensive power, every positive power that can be
given on paper will be evaded & defeated.
Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787), in 24 LETTERS OF
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 228, 229 (Paul H. Smith & Ronald M. Gephart eds.,
1996); see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 51 (1996) (noting that Madison believed
that “so drastic a power could be vested safely in the Union . . . because the national govern-
ment would act with a neutrality or disinterestedness that the states could rarely if ever attain”).
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to pass any measure and the delegates who cast these votes were selected and paid
for by the state legislatures.130 Each state retained its sovereignty and independence,
and each state had one vote in Congress regardless of size.131 In fact, many state legis-
latures actually augmented their popular appeal during the 1780s by enacting all va-
rieties of legislation that benefitted the narrow, local interests of their constituents at
the expense of the national interest.132 Gordon Wood notes: “The economic and
social instability engineered by the Revolution was finding political expression in
the state legislatures at the very time they were larger, more representative, and more
130 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1778, arts. IX–XI.
131 In addition, there was no national judicial system to settle these or other claims among
the states, and the presence of a national government was minuscule. JAMES Q. WILSON & JOHN
J. DIIULIO, JR., AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 21 (11th ed. 2008).
132 James Madison, having served as a state legislator in Virginia, believed that the need to
provide more effective protections for private economic rights was even a stronger impetus
for the Constitutional Convention than correcting the deficiencies within the Articles of Con-
federation, as he wrote to Thomas Jefferson in October 1787:
The mutability of the laws of the States is found to be a serious evil. The
injustice of them has been so frequent and so flagrant as to alarm the
most steadfast friends of Republicanism. I am persuaded I do not err in
saying that the evils issuing from these sources contributed more to that
uneasiness which produced the Convention, and prepared the public
mind for a general reform, than those which accrued to our national char-
acter and interest from the inadequacy of the Confederation to its im-
mediate objects. A reform, therefore, which does not make provision for
private rights, must be materially defective.
1 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 129, at 350. Madison
believed that the representative assemblies in the states were not only corrupting the law by
infringing on individual rights, but also “drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.” THE
FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Thomas Jefferson
joined his fellow Virginian when he warned that all the functions of government—legislative,
executive, and judicial—were being unduly exercised by the legislatures of the various states.
See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 407 (1969).
An example was the state legislature of Vermont:
The legislature, charged the Vermont Council of Census, was reaching
for “uncontrollable dominion” in the administration of justice: becom-
ing a court of chancery in all cases over £4,000, interfering in causes
between parties, reversing court judgments, staying executions after judg-
ments, and even prohibiting court actions in matters pertaining to land
titles or private contracts involving bonds or debts, consequently stop-
ping nine-tenths of all causes in the state. In their assumption of judi-
cial power the legislators had determined every cause, said the Council,
guided by no rules of law but only by their crude notions of equity.
Id. at 407. It was not so much the aristocratic grab for power by a powerful executive that
resonated during the 1780s, but rather the democratic excesses against individual property
rights in the statehouses that motivated the drive for national reform by political elites. Id.
at 407–09.
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powerful than ever before in American history.”133 It was the perceived inequities
at the state level that accelerated the convening of the Constitutional Convention in
Philadelphia, as the states infringed on the foundation of rights that had formed the
consensus ideology leading up to the Revolution.134
The structural limitations of the Articles as a national governing arrangement
gave form to the Critical Period of the 1780s, when the United States struggled with an
array of crises that raised concerns about its viability.135 Gordon Wood elaborates:
The evidence is overwhelming from every source—newspapers,
sermons, and correspondence—that in the minds of many Ameri-
cans the course of the Revolution had arrived at a crucial juncture.
With the problems of war and reconstruction it is unques-
tionable that the period was unsettled—a time of financial con-
fusion and social flux, of great expansion and contraction when
fortunes were made and lost. New governments had to be erected
and made secure; new economic patterns outside of the empire
had to be found; and the void left by the emigration of thousands
of Tories, many in high political and economic positions, had to
be filled—all resulting in political, social, and economic disloca-
tions that have never been adequately measured.136
From a constitutional perspective, the Critical Period of the 1780s contained the
seeds of disorder and disunion that would eventually be resolved within the Federal-
ist regime of the 1790s: the excesses of legislative power in the states, the related risks
associated with democratic despotism, and the pervasive feeling that the practice of
republicanism had been severely corrupted.137 These problems within the states
became national in scope and would open the constitutional space for the construction
133 Id. at 405.
134 These included legislative infringements on property rights, including the enactment of
laws that inhibited trade and commerce, changing the terms of contracts between creditors and
debtors, and using majoritarian processes to diminish the rights of individuals. For a thorough
discussion of how the foundations and ideological orientation of the American Founding con-
flicted with much of the historical context, see generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGI-
CAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); Bernard Bailyn, Common Sense, in
FUNDAMENTAL TESTAMENTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 7, 7–22 (1973). But cf. LEE
WARD, THE POLITICS OF LIBERTY IN ENGLAND AND REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 11–18 (2004)
(arguing that the same intellectual developments shaping American revolutionary thought were
also “radically alter[ing] the constitutional landscape of late-seventeenth-century England”).
135 See 1 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 69, at 106 (highlighting the “impotence” of the
Articles of Confederation).
136 WOOD, supra note 132, at 394.
137 Id. at 393–429.
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of a new regime. The collective experiences of this revolutionary generation would
provide clues to the construction of the Federalist Party’s surprisingly durable con-
stitutional regime during the 1790s. As Forrest McDonald concludes, “[v]arious cir-
cumstances and events” of the period “had eroded Americans’ localism a great deal
by 1789” as the “trauma of the Revolution itself, especially among those who had
actively participated in it” provided the galvanizing event for understanding political
necessities in the 1790s.138
In the process, the Critical Period also led to the cautious, ambivalent realization
by 1787 that perhaps a strong executive might be needed to bring order and national di-
rection during a critical period like the one that Americans were experiencing. In ana-
lyzing the context in which the American Presidency originated, James Ceaser notes:
Executive power, associated by many Whig theorists with mon-
archism no matter under what form it appeared, was distrusted
and jealously circumscribed. . . . [T]hose who took the lead in
calling for the Constitutional Convention had rejected this view
and adopted a decidedly more favorable attitude toward execu-
tive power. Moreover, they saw the unfettered ascendency of the
popular assembly as a symptom of yet a deeper problem: a reli-
ance on popular authority. It was not just that the legislatures
were supreme; it was that they based their power on a claim to
immediate representation of the popular will. . . .
It was the ascendency of these unanticipated popular doctrines
with their prejudice against merit and their theories of unchecked
legislative predominance that led many of the Founders to seek
a new form of government.139
Among the leading Founders, there had been a concerted shift from the 1770s to the
1780s on executive power and its relation to the regime, especially because the Articles
138 FORREST MCDONALD, THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 6 (1974). McDonald
writes:
Men who fought and bled together as comrades in the Continental
Army were generally apt to be transformed into nationalists by the ex-
perience, and many who served the Continental Congress in civilian ca-
pacities had likewise shed their provincialism in the doing. So, too, was
it with inhabitants of those parts of the United States that were militarily
most vulnerable: such ports as Newport, New York, Norfolk, Charleston,
and Savannah, occupied or virtually destroyed during the war, and the
farm country of New Jersey and that of the Virginia and Carolina tide-
water, the main battle areas after 1776.
Id.
139 JAMES W. CEASER, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION 48–49 (1979).
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of Confederation lacked an executive.140 The Presidency would be essential for under-
standing the actual functioning of the new constitutional order.
1. Filling the Constitutional Space with Substantive Meaning
Coming onto the national scene after the American Revolution, the Critical
Period, and the ratification of the new Constitution, George Washington’s placement
in constitutional time (as well as normal chronological time) as the first president
gave him the broadest mandate for establishing a durable regime in line with his
substantive constitutional vision. The futility associated with the Articles of Confed-
eration and the corresponding mischief in the states opened up enormous constitu-
tional space, evident in James Madison’s keen ability to substitute his Virginia Plan
as the new baseline structure at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia—
rather than amending the Articles.141 As the first president, the constitutional slate
was uniquely clean for Washington in a way that it never would be for any of his
successors.142 He was the ultimate reconstructive president.143 When he was inaugu-
rated in New York City in 1789, the survival of the new Constitution and its recon-
structed federal government was anything but assured, particularly because the
nation’s most recent experience with the Articles of Confederation ended every bit
as poorly as the historical record might have predicted.144 Yet for the purposes of
140 See, e.g., GLENN A. PHELPS, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
124–26 (1993) (illustrating Washington’s shifting views on executive power).
141 See Wood, supra note 132, at 472. It is worth noting that in order to amend the Articles,
all thirteen states had to agree, so there remains some debate as to whether the Constitution was
illegally established. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1778, art. XIII. However, whether
or not this new Constitution was formally illegal, it was created and ratified under conditions
of crisis recognized by the majority of Americans who lived through this period. See 1 DE
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 69, at 107 & n.5.
142 PHELPS, supra note 140, at 122.
143 George Washington was completely overlooked by Stephen Skowronek as a reconstruc-
tive president, as Thomas Jefferson leads the reconstructive leadership analysis in opposition
to the Federalist political regime headed by John Adams. See supra note 82 and accompanying
text. Again, this completely overlooks the reconstructive contributions of George Washington,
who wielded a reconstructive stance against the backdrop provided by the former national
government under the Articles of Confederation. Likewise, Bruce Ackerman overlooks
Washington’s indispensable contribution by beginning the analysis with James Madison in
Philadelphia—as if the drafting and ratification of the U.S. Constitution was sufficient to es-
tablish a constitutional regime. See supra note 71. This is even more perplexing as Ackerman
chooses to give sufficient credit to Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt during their re-
spective constitutional moments. These examples are worth noting because the analysis here
seeks to establish what many constitutional law and political science scholars have overlooked:
that President Washington successfully constructed a durable constitutional regime in his image
due to his unique, commanding position within constitutional time.
144 Madison faced the bleak prospect offered by past republican regimes in history—ranging
from ancient Greece and Rome to the more modern examples from the United Netherlands,
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setting up a constitutional order, the opportunity to lock in a new—and in significant
respects, oppositional—constitutional regime could hardly be more fortuitous.145
Indeed, Glenn Phelps provides a useful analogy for assessing Washington’s position
within the given historical context:
If we imagine our constitutional tradition as a great river we can
easily see the important advantage that being first confers. The
first rivulets from the constitutional spring can be made to flow
in almost any direction. Those interested in moving the course
of the stream can steer it as easily one way as another, for there
is little weight behind the water. But later, as the stream contin-
ues it gathers more water, deepening the original channel. Those
wishing to change the flow further downstream find that it re-
quires extraordinary efforts to counter the weight that the river
now carries.146
Washington’s rhetoric and actions tend to show that he clearly understood his posi-
tion in constitutional time. He knew that his choices as president would affect the
meaning of the Constitution for future generations, as he expressed in a letter to sev-
eral of his advisors in the spring of 1789 just after taking office: “‘Many things which
appear of little importance in themselves and at the beginning, may have great and
durable consequences from their having been established at the commencement of
a new General government.’”147 On yet another occasion, Washington reiterated to
James Madison, “‘As the first of everything, in our situation will serve to establish
a Precedent, it is devoutly wished on my part, that these precedents may be fixed on
true principles.’”148 Such statements reflect an early recognition that contemporary
constitutional practices can be said to derive from the persistence of original forms.149
Switzerland, and Poland—while drafting the Constitution. See WOOD, supra note 132, at 472.
Madison would come to the sobering conclusion, which he later placed in one of the Feder-
alist papers, that history consists only of beacon lights “which give warning of the course to
be shunned, without pointing out that which ought to be pursued.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at
226 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
145 The United States Constitution of 1787 would abandon its predecessor as irredeemably
flawed and so the new government could not simply build upon the old baseline. Yet while the
new constitution supplanted the Articles of Confederation, its substantive nature retained much
of the basic commitment to its British common law inheritance. See WHITTINGTON, supra
note 85, at 3–4.
146 PHELPS, supra note 140, at 122–23.
147 Id. at 122 (quoting Washington’s letter).
148 Id. at 124 (quoting Washington).
149 This is true even though not all of the forms that Washington offered became a permanent
part of the constitutional regime. For example, many scholars have noted that no other
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The Constitution depended on institutional forms that sought to refine and shape
popular opinion, tempering its vices, in order to maintain constitutional government
rather than relying on the notion of the “people themselves.”150 Moreover, as Glenn
Phelps notes, “Founding was a continuous and open process in which customs, prac-
tices, and institutions unmentioned in the Constitution would add specific meaning
to the outline of 1787,” and so Washington “shared with many others of the founding
generation the view that a constitution draws its life not merely from the words of the
written document, but also from the deeds and understandings of those responsible
for acting under its commands.”151 Because the constitutional text contained ambigu-
ity, Washington viewed his leadership function as one of explicating the text in a way
that would entrench the Federalist vision of the Constitution.152
The events and national developments from the Critical Period would define the
sorts of decisions that would be addressed in the 1790s, as the disintegration of
the union formed an imminent threat for the first administration.153 In this respect,
Washington’s constitutional leadership was reactionary. The President did not—
because he could not—decide to initiate the construction of a constitutional regime;
the opportunity was already presented for him upon taking office. Instead of making
constitutional politics through personal skills, he implemented a constitutional
vision through a historical opening so wide that no other president would share the
same opportunity—not even Lincoln or FDR. There can be little question that
Washington had a constitutional vision. It is clear from the first days of his adminis-
tration that he had an agenda predicated in large part upon establishing a national
government and presidency independent of and superior to the power of the states.154
As a result, Washington’s constitutional priorities included: ensuring the supremacy
president—not even Andrew Jackson—would lead his troops personally into battle as Washing-
ton did during the Whiskey Rebellion. See id. at 123. And some constitutional practices lasted
some time after he initiated them, such as his preference to limit the use of the presidential
veto to constitutional—as opposed to policy—objections, but have not made it to the present,
as Andrew Jackson changed course for future presidents on the veto power. 1 ACKERMAN,
supra note 1, at 68.
150 THOMAS, supra note 54, at 17.
151 PHELPS, supra note 140, at 122.
152 To systematically study the constitutional regime that George Washington constructed
during his presidency and place it within similarly situated presidents requires: first, an assess-
ment of the historical context that he inherited, as detailed above, and second, an examination
of the way that he acted with regards to constitutional issues. For Washington, the most impor-
tant issues of his presidency were constitutional in nature: the powers of his office, the role of
the federal government, and the clarification of constitutional principles as applied to the newly
formed regime.
153 See PHELPS, supra note 140, at 125.
154 Washington’s unique experience as commander-in-chief during the Revolutionary War
had solidified his views towards the Federalists of the 1780s in Philadelphia, as well as the
actual party by the same name during the 1790s. See id. at 123–27.
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of the national government; clarifying and strengthening the office of the executive,
especially in foreign affairs; exercising limits on power as an indispensable part of
constitutionalism and principled republicanism; and implementing a stable federal
structure for the promotion of a strong national economy, which was a task his
Treasury Secretary Hamilton seemed destined to carry out.155 Washington under-
stood that the office he inherited, while limited—something he himself insisted re-
peatedly as president—was institutionally able to handle the historical crises at hand
with resolve and direction.156 Yet his presidential actions reveal the dual tendencies
of reaction (a product of context) and assertiveness (a product of institutional
design) in the reconstructive stance. And therein lies the paradox to such seemingly
powerful reconstructive presidents like Washington: they react to the inherited his-
torical context by addressing the problems of the moment—issues presidents are
forced to confront because of their importance during times of national crisis—yet
these same presidents decide the direction that the nation will take during such mo-
ments, always in line with their constitutional preferences. The directional or sub-
stantive choices presidents make during these critical moments will have a lasting
impact on the nation’s future because constitutional politics raise the stakes for all the
players involved. This differs from the situation during more normal periods when
constitutional baselines are stable and perform their usual function of lowering the
stakes in politics.
2. Executing a National Constitutional Vision
President Washington’s actions in office highlight the institutional orientation of
the office in general, as well as its specific approach to regime construction and main-
tenance. His actions include a mix of political constructions and invocations of depart-
mentalism, both of which were instrumental and directed towards a larger substantive
constitutional vision.157 Because everything was effectuated upon a blank slate in the
1790s, many instances of departmentalism were also constitutional constructions.
President Washington agreed to Hamilton’s general program for the federal as-
sumption of debts, which was signed into law on August 4, 1790.158 This policy
155 Other important positions that the Federalist Party advanced were the support for a strong,
independent federal judiciary, a more commercial urbanized economy, and a belief in maintain-
ing stronger ties to Britain than France. For an excellent account of the Federalist Party during
this period, see STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM (1993).
156 PHELPS, supra note 140, at 126. While far less enamored about the use of executive power
to entrench Federalist commitments than Hamilton, Washington also understood that the office
had an inherent Hamiltonian dimension priced into his authority during such times. See id.
at 122.
157 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 42, at 76–78 (“The presidents with the authority to
involve the departmentalist logic are also particularly well positioned to foster the political
consensus needed to restructure constitutional meaning.”).
158 MCDONALD, supra note 138, at 75.
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achievement was part of a broader constitutional vision of national supremacy and
economic development that would necessitate the use of federal powers far beyond
that imagined during the 1780s.159 However, the frame of the 1790s was designed to
cure the defects of the previous decade. On the establishment of a national bank,
Hamilton defended its constitutionality against James Madison’s protestations and
convinced Washington—who harbored reservations about the plan—to proceed with
its implementation.160 Hamilton argued on Federalist grounds that the Constitution de-
fined only in general terms the broad powers for which the national government was
created, as it was not feasible to specify powers in minute detail.161 Hamilton argued:
If Congress determined to achieve an end authorized by the
Constitution, it was empowered by the final clause in Article I,
Section 8 (“Congress shall have power . . . to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
foregoing powers”), to use any means that were not prohibited
by the Constitution.162
Federalist Chief Justice John Marshall would consolidate this Federalist construction
with his 1819 decision in M’Culloch v. Maryland.163 The foundations that made such
an interpretation feasible, however, were established within Washington’s broad con-
structions in the 1790s. As Forrest McDonald notes:
Hamilton’s financial system bound the nation with economic ties
that ensured the perdurance of the national government, no mat-
ter how powerful the centrifugal forces in the country as a whole.
The strength of the system lay not so much (as historians have
been wont to suggest) in binding the interests of the wealthy and
more influential members of society to the fate of the national
government as it did in making energetic national government
convenient to the society it served and the absence of such gov-
ernment indescribably inconvenient. A uniform and elastic cur-
rency, based upon a monetized public debt and a national bank,
facilitated the ordinary activities of everyone, from the lowliest
farmer to the greatest international merchant, and to dismantle the
system would have occasioned dislocations of nightmarish com-
plexity. That was the system. President Washington’s role in
159 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
160 MCDONALD, supra note 138, at 77.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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creating it, apart from giving his implied blessing, was nothing
at all—except when he very nearly prevented its creation by pro-
posing to veto the charter of the bank.164
McDonald’s last observation is telling, because it describes the leadership stance
of the nation’s strongest reconstructive president.165 Washington had sufficient
constitutional space to implement nearly any vision—within reasonable limits—that
he wanted because of his position within constitutional time.166 Yet his strategic role
in planning the policy and persuading others of its merits was extremely limited.167
Hamilton understood that the Federalist vision would become constitutionalized
because of the inherent first-mover advantage within the President’s position.168
Washington filled in the available space with many of Hamilton’s substantive priori-
ties, which also carried into the realm of foreign policy, especially because the Hamil-
tonian system depended on the continuation of commercial relations with Britain.169
Therefore, the Treasury Secretary, whose department had nominal ties to foreign rela-
tions in comparison to State or War, implemented a detailed blueprint for announcing
and following a course of neutrality.170
164 MCDONALD, supra note 138, at 185.
165 See supra notes 141–43 and accompanying text.
166 See supra notes 145–48 and accompanying text.
167 See MCDONALD, supra note 138, at 186 (“Washington had done little in his own right,
had often opposed the best measures of his subordinates, and had taken credit for achievements
that he had no share in bringing about.”).
168 See generally PHELPS, supra note 140, at 118–23 (discussing Washington’s determination
to advance the Federalist vision).
169 See MCDONALD, supra note 138, at 120.
170 Id. at 125. This included a draft of a proclamation drawn up by John Jay. Id. The
Washington administration carefully steered a course of neutrality beginning with the Neutral-
ity Proclamation of 1793 and culminating in the Jay Treaty with Britain, which prevented a
potentially devastating war with the mother country—and in spite of the Franco-American
alliance of 1778. Id. at 185. Moreover, the Washington Administration’s opening of the
Mississippi River through Pinckney’s Treaty provided the necessary first steps toward the fu-
ture territorial expansion of the United States, while defusing a set of conditions out west that
could have led to war. Id. at 186. Scholars tend to include in the same category the Washington
Administration’s removal of the threat posed to the nation and its western settlers by the native
tribes and the assortment of colonial powers (Britain, Spain, and France) on the continent. See,
e.g., id. In taking these actions and attempting to enforce them, the Washington Administration
set an important legal and constitutional precedent for the constitutional regime that still holds
to the present day: the dominant role of the executive branch in the conduct of foreign rela-
tions. Washington grounded his actions upon the Constitution’s provision of the President
as commander-in-chief under Article II. Cf. id. at 126. His foreign policy decisions—because
of their placement in constitutional time as the first institutional ordering of such powers
within the executive branch—actually had an effect on the constitutional regime in ways that
it would not for subsequent presidents.
2015] THE ARCHITECTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL TIME 1127
Fewer scholars have noticed Washington’s invocation of departmentalism than
have noticed the more famous instances by Presidents Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln,
and Franklin Roosevelt. In part, this is because Washington’s departmentalism seems
far less aggressive by modern standards and has become part of the normal functioning
of the Presidency. Yet when Washington invoked departmentalist logic, Congress
viewed it skeptically because his constructions were relatively new and, as a result,
vigorously debated. When Washington asserted the authority of his office to inter-
pret the Constitution, it was not the Court that posed the greatest obstacle, but rather
Congress. This was particularly true in the years before Chief Justice John Marshall
established his indelible imprint on the Court, which included the public pronounce-
ment of judicial review in the 1803 decision Marbury v. Madison171 and a series of
landmark cases asserting national authority over the next three decades.172 During
the 1790s, the federal judiciary assumed its anticipated role as Hamilton’s least dan-
gerous branch capable of exercising “neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judg-
ment.”173 Indeed, far from directly challenging the authority of the Court, President
Washington and the Federalists believed strongly in promoting the prestige and
independence of the federal judiciary,174 which was a more difficult task than some
commentators tend to acknowledge. Many of his appointees politely rejected offers
to serve on the Supreme Court for other opportunities in government at the state level,
including one of his first appointees to be an associate justice, John Rutledge, who
resigned from the bench in 1791 before the Court actually heard any cases in order
to assume the role of Chief Justice of South Carolina—a post that he regarded as
being more significant.175 Washington’s departmentalism assumed the role of “Chief
Magistrate”—a term that he deliberately used most often when referring to his own
presidency—in controlling “the meaning and application of the Constitution for the
people, the states, and other branches of the federal government.”176
Because Congress was considered the most legitimate interpreter of the Consti-
tution, a more explicit example of Washington’s departmentalism was his Neutrality
Proclamation of 1793.177 As hostilities were escalating between Britain and France,
the President relied on Hamilton’s logic for staying neutral towards the pending
conflict, which could have debilitated the crisis-ridden, war-weary republic at a criti-
cal period.178 Washington outflanked Congress in this area because the legislative
171 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177–78 (1803).
172 See infra notes 192–202 and accompanying text.
173 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
174 See Henry J. Abraham & Barbara A. Perry, The Father of Our Country as Court-
Packer-in-Chief: George Washington and the Supreme Court, in GEORGE WASHINGTON AND
THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 135, 136, 143 (Mark J. Rozell et al. eds., 2000).
175 Id. at 137.
176 PHELPS, supra note 140, at 141–42.
177 See id. at 172.
178 See MCDONALD, supra note 138, at 125–27.
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branch had the power to declare war under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.179
However, the President claimed his constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief
under Article II to effectively preclude Congress’s authority in this area.180 Although
Washington was officially restating the status quo—the fact that the United States
was neutral—his declaration made it nearly impossible for Congress to go in a differ-
ent direction, especially because Washington was a reconstructive leader invoking a
departmentalist argument to achieve a more important substantive task: safeguarding
the new republic against further crises and risks that could undermine it.181 Often this
episode is cited as an instance of the executive branch’s dominance in the area of for-
eign affairs and national security, which it was, but it equally qualifies as an instance
of departmentalism where the President asserted his interpretation on the extent of
executive authority at the expense of Congress. To the extent that Washington sought
an equal claim to interpret the Constitution as Congress, he did so for limited purposes
consistent with the needs of a nation attempting to withstand a period of crisis.182
In terms of construction, Washington believed that he had the independent right
to decide a bill’s constitutionality, which he executed by different methods: he vetoed
laws that he thought clearly violated the Constitution; he signed bills that he thought
passed that test, usually without regards to their ultimate merits on policy; and he imple-
mented the laws on the books.183 Indeed, both Washington’s constitutional construc-
tions and departmentalism were tempered by the fact that he was a constitutional
literalist in areas where he viewed the document’s text and meaning to be clear.184
He limited his own authority in many instances because he thought the Constitution
called for such limitations either in law or spirit.185 For example, as previously noted,
he was often particularly deferential to Congress in the area of domestic legislation.186
He would suggest items that Congress should address without advocating his own
positions, even on various issues on which he had strong views.187 Phelps observed:
Constitutionally, [Washington] could argue that this power derived
from his authority “to take care that the laws . . . be faithfully
executed.” But the claim would be credible only if Washington
could show ample evidence of his willingness to be bound by
179 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (Congress shall have power “[t]o declare war”).
180 Cf. PHELPS, supra note 140, at 177.
181 For arguments on both sides of this issue, see generally HAMILTON & MADISON, supra
note 105.
182 PHELPS, supra note 140, at 193–94.
183 See Yoo, supra note 106, at 65, 96.
184 See PHELPS, supra note 140, at 136–39.
185 See id.
186 Id. at 139–42.
187 Id. at 139–40.
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the text of the Constitution, even, and especially, when the matter
at hand affected the nominal power of the presidency.188
Washington’s self-imposed limitations on his own authority should not be con-
fused with a lack of an interpretation or a weak presidency. Instead, his assertion of
presidential limits was instrumental towards his broader reconstructive vision of
establishing a strong legitimate national government in the eyes of the American
public. So while not as outwardly aggressive as Lincoln or FDR, he was most effec-
tive in implementing his substantive constitutional vision. Phelps argues that “[a]n
appropriate (and highly visible) deference to the Constitution and to the other branches
of the federal government was actually part of a strategy for establishing a strong
presidency.”189 And this is the other side of establishing a unitary presidency as the
first in time: knowing where to draw appropriate boundaries on presidential author-
ity even if the available constitutional space is ample and discretionary. Washington
was a rare reconstructive president because he did not assert the full extent of his
authority when he clearly had the opportunity to do so. However, this was part of his
constitutional vision, which was essential to the ultimate success and durability of his
constitutional regime.
3. The New Federalist Baseline
Washington constructed a constitutional regime through a series of decisions on
major issues that established the nation on firm Federalist foundations with regards
to the supremacy and legitimacy of the national government.190 Yet Washington’s
constitutional regime was not built in a day; the space that was opened for him as first
president afforded him broad discretion to implement his preferred set of commit-
ments. Decision by decision, he gave the Federalist constitutional regime form and
substance. Washington may have been a skilled national leader; however, it was the
breadth and depth of the available constitutional space that determined the viability
and sustainability of his constitutional regime.
The result of Washington’s assertion of his substantive constitutional vision is that
the dominant interpretation of the Constitution would favor the supremacy of the na-
tional law, with state law having to give way. Moreover, the Federalist vision afforded
the Supreme Court the institutional authority to decide what the Constitution meant,
as judicial review still needed a defense as a legitimate constitutional construction
188 Id. at 141–42.
189 Id. at 138.
190 In addition, the Federalist constitutional vision included the necessity of strength and
independence of the executive office and somewhat paradoxically, the notion of limits on po-
litical power as an essential part of American constitutionalism. See id. at 126–27. In reality,
these were instrumental towards the vision of a competent national government, but all funda-
mentally changed the nature of the constitutional regime in fundamental ways.
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in the 1790s.191 On March 8, 1796 in the Supreme Court’s decision in Hylton v. United
States,192 it ruled that a carriage tax levied in 1794 at the suggestion of Treasury
Secretary Hamilton was not a direct tax but an excise.193 McDonald writes:
The constitutional significance of the case was that in it the Court
ruled for the first time on the constitutionality of an act of Con-
gress. The political significance was that in upholding the tax,
which fell mainly upon Virginia and South Carolina aristocrats
to whom elegant carriages were a way of life, the Supreme Court
convinced Southern Republicans that it was futile to appeal to the
federal courts to support their constitutional theories.194
After the presidencies of Washington and Adams, the two most famous Marshall
decisions, Marbury v. Madison195 in 1803 and M’Culloch v. Maryland196 in 1819,
further consolidated Washington’s vision, completing the process of constitutional-
ization until the next set of historical triggers opened up enough constitutional space
to revisit the issue.197 Other landmark Marshall decisions that entrenched the Feder-
alist constitutional vision reaffirmed the supremacy of the federal government, like his
ruling in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee198 in 1816, where he rejected Virginia’s claim that
the Supreme Court could not review the decisions of state courts.199 More importantly,
191 See generally Gordon S. Wood, Judicial Review in the Era of the Founding, in IS THE
SUPREME COURT THE GUARDIAN OF THE CONSTITUTION? 153 (Robert A. Licht ed., 1993) (dis-
cussing the evolution of the concept of judicial review from the 1760s through the early 1800s).
192 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
193 Id. at 180 (“A tax on carriages . . . of course is not a direct tax.”).
194 MCDONALD, supra note 138, at 175. McDonald notes that this landmark decision was
reached without a sitting Supreme Court Justice, “since Rutledge had been rejected by the
Senate and his successor, Oliver Ellsworth, did not take his seat until after the arguments had
been heard.” Id.
195 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
196 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
197 In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall ruled that the Supreme Court could
declare an act of Congress unconstitutional. 5 U.S. at 177–78. In M’Culloch v. Maryland,
Marshall ruled that the power granted by the Constitution to the federal government originates
from the people rather than the states, and thus should be generously construed to allow any
federal laws that are “necessary and proper” to the attainment of legitimate constitutional ends.
17 U.S. at 323–24. In addition, Marshall wrote that federal law is supreme over state law, and
therefore, a state institution could not tax a federal institution because the power to tax was
equivalent to the power to destroy. Id. at 391–92.
198 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
199 In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, Virginia courts were ready to acknowledge the supremacy
of the U.S. Constitution but believed that they had as much right as the Supreme Court to de-
cide what the Constitution meant. 14 U.S. at 305–06. The Supreme Court felt otherwise, and
asserted its own broad powers to review any state court ruling if that decision seemed to violate
federal law or the federal Constitution. Id. at 315; see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
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Marshall consolidated the power of the Federal Government to regulate commerce
among the states in the famous Gibbons v. Ogden200 case, privileging federal law over
state law when the two conflicted.201 Marshall’s decision in Gibbons would be influ-
ential over a century later, as there were relatively few important rulings on the com-
merce power until the era of antitrust legislation in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.202 While the concept of national supremacy may sound rather
obvious today, it was far more controversial at the time, and was only consolidated
through a Federalist Chief Justice appointed by Federalist President John Adams in
the late 1790s. The important point is that constitutional regimes take time to consol-
idate, which is the main task of the judiciary within the separation of powers. However,
the judiciary operates in a space that has initially been carved out by a reconstructive
president’s historical opportunity.
4. President Jefferson as a Suggestive Counterfactual
If Thomas Jefferson had been the first president instead of George Washington,
his placement within constitutional time would have led to a very different regime
than the one created by the first Federalist president and his vice president, John
Adams, who became his successor in office, extending and completing that Federalist
constitutional vision. There was enough constitutional space available in the 1790s
that President Jefferson would have been a formidable president because of his co-
herent constitutional vision. His constitutional imprint would have been even more
far-reaching and durable than the one he had an opportunity to build during the first
decade of the nineteenth century.
Aside from the agrarian states’ rights policy orientation of the Jeffersonian
Administration, which would have pushed a different set of preferences during the
1790s, the influence of John Marshall—and perhaps the prominence and prestige of
the Supreme Court itself—would have been a nullity. Thomas Jefferson’s choice for
Chief Justice would likely have been Spencer Roane, and his task of consolidating
the Republicans’ constitutional commitments would have been very different from
Marshall’s.203 Jefferson maintained his doubts about the new national government
Wheat.) 264, 310 (1821) (reaffirming the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state
court decisions).
200 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
201 In Gibbons v. Ogden, Robert Fulton, the inventor of the steamboat, received a monopoly
right from New York State to operate his steamboat on the Hudson River. 22 U.S. at 2–3. How-
ever, the Marshall Court overturned the license because the river connected New York and New
Jersey and was therefore considered interstate commerce rather than intrastate commerce.
Id. at 64–66. Therefore, the federal law in the conflict was supreme, which stamped the national
government’s authority in an area that would be its most important in the future, especially
the twentieth century. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 97–98 (12th ed. 1991).
202 See GUNTHER, supra note 201, at 97–100.
203 For an excellent analysis of Jefferson’s constitutional preferences for the Supreme Court
during his presidency, see generally ACKERMAN, supra note 71.
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and its potential usurpation of state autonomy by the executive branch and the federal
judiciary. A Jefferson Administration during the 1790s would not have been as pro-
nounced in its differences with the confederated national government of the 1780s,
notwithstanding the ratification of a written constitution.204 Hamilton’s domestic plan
for the national economy would not have institutionalized a national banking system
and the assumption of debts in the manner it did, and relations with Great Britain and
France would have been quite different.205 While Washington and Jefferson both
shared a similar belief in natural rights as a political foundation, the means in which
such first principles of constitutionalism applied differed greatly between them, as the
partisan divide between Federalist and Democratic Republicans became more ap-
parent as new issues came on to the national scene.206
It is worth noting here that the seeds of the opposition to a constitutional regime
construction like Washington’s are always present within the American politics through
204 See generally id.; JOHN FERLING, ADAMS VS. JEFFERSON (2004).
205 Suggestive evidence of this is provided by Jefferson’s antagonistic stance towards
Hamilton’s foreign policy views during the Washington Administration in the 1790s. See
FERLING, supra note 204.
206 James Ceaser notes some of these differences as applied to the economic and political
foundations:
[T]he wisdom of the Jeffersonian legislator consists in establishing laws
and norms that remove impediments to the spontaneous operation of na-
ture. The famous expression that captured this strategy, a term which has
been attributed to the Physiocrats, is laissez faire, meaning “allow to
do,” or, embellishing a bit, “allow nature to follow its course.” The ver-
sion of this doctrine that is better known to us today was formulated by
Adam Smith, a disciple of the Physiocrats, under the label “the system
of natural liberty” or, more simply, “the invisible hand.”
Followers of this understanding of nature among the Jeffersonian-
republicans applied it to a broad range of political policies. One of the
earliest and most important was in the area of economic policy, where
Hamilton’s plans for political and economic development became the
central domestic issue around which the political parties formed. . . .
For Federalists, the concept of nature in relation to political life
remained anchored in the science of politicized psychology. There was
no reason to think that the laws of spontaneous order that governed
physical matters also governed human matters in the political realm. In
fact, experience showed the opposite. In the political realm, chaos and
force were often the prevailing facts of reality, requiring constant super-
intendence. . . . The “laws” that often seemed to apply to one area (eco-
nomics) did not govern in another (politics). The attempt to impute a
general rule of spontaneous order to political affairs represented an un-
warranted extension of the natural sciences into the political realm.
James W. Ceaser, Foundational Concepts and American Political Development, in JAMES
W. CEASER, NATURE AND HISTORY IN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 1, 31–32 (2006)
(footnote omitted).
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the party system and the structure of federalism, which provide pockets of dissent
that enable challenges to the dominant constitutional order at a more opportune time.
The areas that the partisan opposition choose to challenge tend to be those that are
most vulnerable politically. However, their success in overturning that regime when
given a historical opening depends on the presence of constitutional time.
B. Theodore Roosevelt and the Frustrations of Constitutional Time
By historical standards, Theodore Roosevelt achieved a robust political legacy, im-
plementing a nationalist Republican version of the Progressive agenda in economic
regulation, antitrust, foreign policy, conservation, public administration, governmental
corruption, and the broadening of the executive branch in American politics.207 His
popularity in office afforded him ample political capital to pursue his preferred policy
commitments, suggesting the possibility of a reconstructive presidency.208 While
Roosevelt inherited opportunities for change that were more politically auspicious
than those that await most presidents—with the Progressive movement building
momentum209—ultimately, he did not govern during an extraordinary national crisis.210
The absence of constitutional time would limit his constitutional legacy. As a result,
his presidency illustrates the salience of constitutional time in constructing constitu-
tional meaning.
1. A President with Progressive Constitutional Ambitions
Theodore Roosevelt viewed his moment as reconstructive in nature. He assumed
the classic reconstructive posture of invoking tradition and precedent while at the same
time breaking with it. As Thomas notes, “In his 1905 inaugural address, Roosevelt in-
voked Lincoln as the great preserver of the republic, suggesting that, while the specific
207 See generally SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY,
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2009); SKOWRONEK, supra note 4,
at 228–59; JEAN M. YARBROUGH, THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL
TRADITION (2012).
208 See, e.g., MILKIS, supra note 207 (discussing how Roosevelt and the Progressive party
rose to popularity); YARBOROUGH, supra note 207, at 169–78 (noting that the conservation
movement afforded Roosevelt a popular issue with which “to shift policymaking away from
Congress”). It is worth reiterating that in his book, Stephen Skowronek does not consider
Theodore Roosevelt a reconstructive president, but rather an articulation president or orthodox
innovator within the established Republican Party political regime. See SKOWRONEK, supra
note 4, at 230–33.
209 The Progressive movement would only achieve national dominance from 1913–1918.
See Ceaser, supra note 206, at 60.
210 This speaks to the truly rarified company that presidents who construct constitutional
regimes tend to keep compared to the policy achievements that most presidents are able to
achieve. The Progressive movement was one of the more sweeping in American history, affect-
ing both major parties in significant ways. Yet its failure to produce a lasting constitutional
regime provides some indication of the extent of historical context needed to effectuate more
significant constitutional change.
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tasks before [the nation] where [sic] unknown to the past, ‘the spirit in which these
tasks must be undertaken . . . remains essentially unchanged.’”211 This tactic pre-
served space for Roosevelt to distance himself from the classical liberalism that
emphasized constitutional forms and limits, and instead focus on the potential for
positive government.212 He framed his substantive constitutional vision within the
Federalist tradition of stronger national authority associated with Alexander Hamilton
and John Marshall, while at the same time moving away from the foundational prem-
ises of natural rights that informed these same leading Federalists.213 He called for a
national “debate over the content of [the nation’s] most fundamental commitments,”214
in which democracy would replace liberalism as the chief foundational element in
the regime.215 In other words, Roosevelt’s Progressive vision sought to reconstruct
constitutional meaning to fit the needs of the day with a mixture of pure democracy,
government activism, and presidential leadership.216 The Progressive intellectual
Herbert Croly described “[t]he whole tendency of his programme” as giving “a dem-
ocratic meaning and purpose to the Hamiltonian tradition and method”—effectively
governing as a “Hamiltonian with a difference.”217 While Roosevelt did not insist on
211 THOMAS, supra note 54, at 73 (omission in original).
212 See YARBROUGH, supra note 207, at 78. In a comprehensive account of Theodore
Roosevelt’s political thought, Jean Yarbrough writes:
Roosevelt’s treatment of the founding in his histories is at best equivocal.
Although he admired the work of the Framers (at least the more national-
minded of them) and at this point in his political career, warmly supported
the Constitution, there is no evidence that Roosevelt had ever read John
Locke or given much thought to the philosophical underpinnings of
classical liberalism. . . .
Even more telling was that, in contrast to Lincoln, Roosevelt never
invoked the principles of the Declaration to condemn slavery. To be sure,
Roosevelt denounced slavery as a “moral evil” but he did so by calling
it an offense against “the true standards of humanity and Christianity,”
not a violation of natural right. This was because, unlike his heroes,
Roosevelt did not see nature as a source of moral principle. His under-
standing of nature was derived from science, not philosophy.
Id. at 78, 79 (footnote omitted).
213 See generally Howard Gillman, The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the
Rise of the Notion of the “Living Constitution” in the Course of American State-Building,
11 STUDS. AM. POL. DEV. 191 (1997); Howard Gillman, Preferred Freedoms: The Progressive
Expansion of State Power and the Rise of Modern Civil Liberties Jurisprudence, 47 POL. RES.
Q. 623 (1994) (discussing the general shift from nineteenth-century views of “constructing
general protections for liberty broadly defined” to “the question of which discrete liberties were
most fundamental”).
214 THOMAS, supra note 54, at 68.
215 Id. at 67.
216 Id.; see also Ceaser, supra note 206, at 59–66 (“A new and bolder course of action was
required, in which government would have more authority and discretion to arrange or ratio-
nalize social processes.”).
217 HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE 169 (1909).
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overthrowing the entire constitutional order, as some of the leading Progressives
did,218 he preferred the notion of breaking with some of its key inherited meanings.
In practice, this meant expanding Congress’s power to regulate, significantly narrowing
economic due process and property rights, and elevating presidential authority (seen
as a tribune for the people) against the judiciary (seen as a symbol of constitutional
forms and limitations).219
Roosevelt was cognizant and rather straightforward about his reconstructive
ambitions, writing in his autobiography that he had been prepared to act under “the
Jackson-Lincoln theory of the Presidency [because] occasionally great national crises
arise which call for immediate and vigorous executive action.”220 By contrast, he
would accuse his presidential successor, William Howard Taft, of subscribing to the
James Buchanan theory of the presidency because of Taft’s refusal to follow his stew-
ardship theory.221 Consistent with his reconstructive vision, Roosevelt conducted his
own administration in an authoritative manner, expanding the scope of presidential
power beyond what anyone had previously imagined during normal times.222 In line
with mainstream Progressive thinking, he believed that “the executive branch was
the dominant, not merely a coordinate, branch of the federal government.”223 This
was most evident in his rhetoric and his stewardship theory of presidential power,
which claimed that any executive powers not explicitly prohibited under the Consti-
tution, or by statute, were available to the President as the steward of the American
people.224 Consequently, as a central feature of his program for judicial reform,
Roosevelt sought to minimize the influence of the federal courts. He framed the issue
as concentrating “too much power in the bench,” requiring a commensurate response
218 This sentiment was held by many leading Progressives and took a variety of forms. For
example, the Progressive intellectual historian Vernon Parrington would write: “Considered
historically perhaps the chief contribution of the Progressive movement to American political
thought was its discovery of the essentially undemocratic nature of the federal Constitution.”
Ceaser, supra note 206, at 62 (quoting Vernon Parrington, Introduction to J. ALLEN SMITH,
GROWTH AND DECADENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, at xi (1930)). Similarly,
Herbert Croly, the founder and editor of The New Republic would write: “The Law in the shape
of the Federal Constitution really came to be a monarchy of the Word.” Id. at 62 (quoting
HERBERT CROLY, PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY 77 (1998)).
219 And while the notion of a “living constitution” would gain traction later in the century,
its foundational premises were first advocated during this period. Ceasar, supra note 206, at 66.
220 THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 464 (1926). Roosevelt would argue in the
same autobiography, “I did not usurp power, but I did greatly broaden the use of executive
power.” Id. at 357.
221 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 48, at 240. That Roosevelt viewed Lincoln and Jackson
as presidential models is telling, as it signaled a particularized reading of the office’s powers
as contingent on personal traits—the occupant affirmatively choosing to follow the Jackson-
Lincoln theory of the presidency—rather than acknowledging the contextual circumstances
necessary for heightened authority.
222 See id. at 240–41.
223 Id. at 239.
224 Id. at 245.
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from the executive branch.225 Yet this still fell short of the departmentalist claims
invoked by nineteenth century presidents like Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln.226 He
understood how negatively the public might react to the image of a president usurping
judicial authority,227 and tried hard to avoid a direct confrontation with the Court like
President Jackson had after Chief Justice Marshall’s ruling in Worcester v. Georgia.228
2. The Constraints of Constitutional Time
Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency provides the most interesting case for analysis
within the frame of constitutional time because of its intersection of political saliency
with constitutional futility. Roosevelt had a clear understanding of the constitutional
vision that he wanted to entrench. He was certainly more aggressive about his ambi-
tions than President Washington was, displaying a range of bold presidential actions
that went beyond anything the first president would have endorsed. However, the con-
fluence of formal power and historical context—as great as it was for policy-level
achievements—could not come close to realigning constitutional baselines. On the
major constitutional questions of his time, Roosevelt encountered major frustrations.
The decision in Lochner v. New York229 was issued in 1905 following a sweeping
re-election victory and a range of policy-level achievements.230 The case itself, which
225 WHITTINGTON, supra note 42, at 261–63.
226 See SCIGLIANO, supra note 86, at 23–44 (discussing the relationships Jefferson, Jackson,
and Lincoln had with the Court).
227 However, as Whittington observed, after Roosevelt left office and announced his intention
to run for president in the election of 1912, he displayed the full extent of his disdain for the
judiciary by declaring “that [its] rulings invalidating laws on constitutional grounds ‘should
be subject to revision by the people themselves’ through a ‘right to recall’ individual [rulings].”
WHITTINGTON, supra note 42, at 262.
228 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) (holding that the Cherokee nation is a “distinct
community occupying its own territory . . . in which the laws of Georgia can have no force” and
that “[t]he whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is . . . vested in the
[federal] government”). Worcester is perhaps more famous for President Jackson’s apocryphal
response to Chief Justice Marshall’s decision: “John Marshall has made his decision, now let
him enforce it!” WHITTINGTON, supra note 42, at 33–34 (noting that although Jackson never
made that specific declaration, the aftermath of the case provides an excellent example of ten-
sions between the executive and judicial branches).
229 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, the Supreme Court ruled that New York State’s Bakeshop
Act of 1895, which set limits on maximum hours, was an unconstitutional deprivation of the
employer and employee’s due process rights to “life, liberty, and property” under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 53, 64. Justice Peckham framed the issue around whether the maximum
hours regulation was a “fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police power of the
State” or “an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference” with the parties’ liberty of
contract. Id. at 56. Writing for a 5–4 majority, Peckham ruled that the maximum hours pro-
vision fell within the latter category and was therefore unconstitutional, noting that the “mere
assertion that the subject relates though but in a remote degree to the public health does not
necessarily render the enactment valid.” Id. at 57.
230 Thomas, supra note 54, at 187–89.
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overturned the maximum hours provision of the New York State Bakeshop Act of
1895, was more important for its symbolic significance as an era than what it had
ruled—or has been perceived to represent.231 Roosevelt understood this and vigor-
ously opposed the majority decision preserving Fourteenth Amendment economic
due process protections for liberty of contract, arguing that the Court had favored
property rights over human rights, and invoking Lincoln’s preference for human
rights over property, which, of itself, could have no rights or vote.232 He even singled
out Lochner in The New Nationalism as indicative of the “‘ill-defined limits in which
neither the nation nor any state should be able to exercise effective control, especially
over big corporations.’”233 Roosevelt expressed his conviction to one of the dissent-
ing justices in Lochner that “if the ‘spirit’ of that decision became pervasive in the ju-
diciary, then ‘we should not only have a revolution, but it would be necessary to have
a revolution.’”234 Yet Roosevelt would be incapable of cashing in on his revolutionary
ambitions even if he had a serious inclination to do so. Constitutional baselines only
realign significantly when prompted by an exogenous shock, necessitating presiden-
tial action to redirect the regime. Roosevelt could not challenge the Court’s authority
because there was no need to do so. While Lochner has become part of Jack Balkin’s
anticanonical cases in constitutional law, opinion was divided at the time.235 More-
over, Roosevelt himself was the leader of a faction of the majority party at the time.
The more Conservative Republican faction could not be counted upon to support a
challenge to judicial authority.236 Because Roosevelt was not aligned with constitu-
tional time, any invocation of departmentalism was unavailable to him.
Similarly, Roosevelt insisted that Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce
was “‘an absolute and unqualified grant, and without limitations other than those
prescribed by the Constitution . . . [and that] this power has not been exhausted by
231 See generally BERNSTEIN, supra note 115 (arguing that much of the conventional
narrative regarding the Lochner era is historically inaccurate).
232 THOMAS, supra note 54, at 85. In one sense, this argument seems ironic since Lincoln
himself believed deeply in the free labor ideas of the Republican Party of the 1850s and 1860s,
which were an important part of the arguments against slavery and the foundational core of the
Civil War amendments. The basic idea was that the individual owned the right to her own labor
and to take it without compensation was synonymous with theft, as the term “man-theft” was
used by abolitionists to refer to slavery.
233 Id.
234 WHITTINGTON, supra note 42, at 261 (quoting Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to
William Rufus Day (Jan. 11, 1908), in THE LETTERS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 903, 904
(Elting E. Morison & John M. Blum eds., 1952)).
235 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 115, at 116–18 (noting that Gerald Gunther’s constitutional
law textbook of the 1970s was the first to devote a substantial amount of space to the substan-
tive due process decisions of the Lochner era and suggesting that the anticanonical narrative
might be anachronistic).
236 WHITTINGTON, supra note 42, at 262.
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any legislation now on the statute books.’”237 In discussing Roosevelt’s attempt at
Progressive Reconstruction, George Thomas writes:
Roosevelt did not reference the Court’s opinions. And while
nothing he said explicitly contradicted them—in fact, some of the
language, “directly upon such commerce,” for example, seemed
consistent with them—he rejected the notion that the Sherman
Act simply embraced the common law. Such an understanding
suggested that the act broke with traditional regulation, poten-
tially calling forth far more expansive national administration.238
This description suggests the peculiar bind that Theodore Roosevelt found himself
in as a result of constitutional time. He was careful and strategic in his actions, taking
what the context would allow in order to further his constitutional vision. When com-
pared with the blank slate of President Washington or the bold departmentalist logic
of Lincoln, Roosevelt seems measured and restrained. This is not by temperament or
will but rather by built-in constraints from historical context. He could not challenge
the Court’s view on commerce because he did not have the warrants to do so. There-
fore, despite the Court’s ruling in Swift & Co. v. United States239 that same year ex-
tending Congress’s power to regulate via a stream of commerce theory,240 the era of
dual federalism in commerce clause jurisprudence continued unimpeded by Roosevelt’s
protestations in favor of a more expansive reading of Congress’s power. The differ-
ence between changes to the higher law versus normal politics at the policy level is
considerable—and beyond the autonomous desires of individual presidents.
As a result of the limited historical context available for realigning constitutional
baselines, Roosevelt was a constrained president. Unlike reconstructive presidents
such as Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln before him, Roosevelt would
brush against the limits of his authority at the policy level. Presidents do not get the
opportunity to choose the context in which they take office and they do not come into
office with a label like “reconstructive president.” As a result, they are reactive to
the environment while showing initiative as well, coming into contact with the polit-
ical context through their actions and rhetoric. Roosevelt was a strong president but
due to the lack of constitutional time, he could not replace the Supreme Court as the
dominant interpreter of the Constitution. Roosevelt encountered a normal baseline,
where the best he could do was lay the groundwork for changes that would manifest
during a more opportune period. This would occur during the Great Depression when
237 THOMAS, supra note 54, at 72–73.
238 Id. at 73.
239 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
240 Id. at 396–98 (ruling that Congress could prohibit local business activity in an effort to
regulate interstate commerce because when the activity was combined together, it would form
a stream of commerce between the states).
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his distant cousin Franklin Delano Roosevelt would inherit sufficient space to entrench
a new and quite different constitutional regime.241
Where available, Theodore Roosevelt would seek to influence the direction of
the Court in the future time by galvanizing the political movement he inherited, setting
substantive goals for future administrations and legislators, and making key appoint-
ments to the Supreme Court. For example, Roosevelt’s nomination of Oliver Wendell
Holmes to the Supreme Court in 1902 would influence the direction of the Court in
the 1930s and 1940s by adopting a Holmesian jurisprudence of judicial deference
and evolving standards of social justice during the New Deal.242 Holmes’s famous
dissent in Lochner would provide a judicial standard for the New Deal Court. Yet the
fact that the first President Roosevelt could not construct a constitutional regime
congruent with his political commitments speaks to the dominant role that constitu-
tional time plays in influencing and structuring constitutional meaning.
CONCLUSION
In Constitutional Redemption, Jack Balkin offers a description of constitutional
law as a narrative where social movements, political influences, principles, and his-
torical timing all contribute to the way in which Americans approach and understand
the Constitution. In one memorable passage, he writes:
The idea that Constitutions serve primarily to secure liberty by
constraining the future is a hopeful illusion. Good constitutions
enable as much as they constrain. They create channels for pol-
itics, both good and bad. At best they create flexible frameworks
in which others will build fruitfully, meeting the challenges of the
future; at worst they create problems and obstacles to overcome,
sometimes leading to blind alleys and dead ends, sometimes to
the replacement of old constitutions with new ones. France has
gone through Four Republics and is now on its Fifth; we are still
officially on our first. This is not because our Constitution is so
fixed but because it has proved so flexible.243
While some of Balkin’s focus on a narrative or story differs in significant respects
from the one presented here, his emphasis on flexibility, constitutional baselines
(“channels for politics”244), and a holistic approach to constitutional law lie at the core
241 See Thomas, supra note 54, at 94–97.
242 See, e.g., id. at 87 (discussing the impact of Holmes’s Lochner dissent on later consti-
tutional debate).
243 BALKIN, supra note 33, at 9.
244 Id.
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of this discussion. In some ways, it seems that he might be alluding to constitutional
renewal as much as redemption.
The need for constitutional renewal placed constitutional time at such a prominent
place in American constitutionalism. Constitutional time has provided a channel for
renewal without the need for a revolution, and ultimately, has played a crucial role
in understanding constitutional law and structuring constitutional meaning. Time was
institutionalized into the constitutional structure just as much as the separation of pow-
ers or federalism because it was essential to the maintenance and regeneration of the
regime. In other words, time has been imbedded into the architecture of the Constitu-
tion, and in this way, foundational law can be considered self-correcting in its design
and function. It would enable different generations of Americans to benefit from the
stabilizing features of the rule of law and normal politics without hindering their abil-
ity to overcome historical crises that had previously undone republican regimes.
In yet another passage within Constitutional Redemption, Balkin comments that
“[c]onstitutions in practice produce winners and losers. The winners proclaim its
goodness; the losers are marginalized, demonized, or forgotten. For these losers, con-
stitutions remain agreements with hell.”245 It is here that Balkin reveals an implicit
insight about constitutional law: that it provides incentive structures and always has.
The very idea that a constitution provides security by locking in rights or process—
whether a real constraint to future action or a “hopeful illusion”246—may be shared
by political players and judicial actors. And if they believe that this Constitution prom-
ises such security, then they will act in ways that reveal this belief, which is largely
what the struggle to define and structure constitutional meaning has shown. They want
to avoid “agreements with hell”247 to the greatest extent possible and correspond-
ingly, display actions that reveal a strong intention to win.
In particular, presidents are incentivized by the lure of a historical legacy to lock
in their preferred constitutional vision by the most secure means available. The prom-
ise of a constitutional regime provides the type of protection they seek against an
uncertain future: one where successive presidents, the partisan opposition, the rival
political branches, and the bureaucracy can be counted upon to provide a different
set of preferences. Yet presidents themselves cannot affirmatively choose to construct
a constitutional regime or realign a constitutional baseline. If they did, every presi-
dent would have done so. Chester Arthur did not have the same set of options avail-
able to him as Lincoln or FDR. Formal Article II power has never defined the full
extent of presidential authority—historical context has. As a result, constitutional
time provides the opportunity for the full extension of executive authority within a
regenerative constitutional cycle. The bold new directions that a regime incorporates
during constitutional time reflect this.
245 Id. at 11.
246 Id. at 9.
247 Id. at 11.
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Constitutional baselines rarely change. When they do, it is as a result of historical
crises that credibly threaten to destabilize the established order: the presence of consti-
tutional time. Historical exigencies cause constitutional baselines to become contested
and fluid. Then, space opens for presidents to substitute their preferred constitutional
vision within the existing Constitution. The clearest instances of this occurred within
the midst of the greatest threats to the Republic: the period of heightened uncertainty
following the American Founding, the Civil War and its aftermath, and the Great
Depression. Since presidents are at the furthest reaches of their power during such
periods, they are able to successfully challenge the judiciary’s interpretation of law
through a range of strategies, including the invocation of departmentalism, the exe-
cution of broad constructions, or the introduction of new amendments. This arduous
process can be tumultuous and loaded with risk, but presidents engage in them because
of the promise of safeguarding their foundational principles and partisan commit-
ments for the foreseeable future. Presidents understand that constitutions produce
winners and losers, and as a result, presidents attempt to construct regimes that con-
strain the available choice of legislators and the judiciary.
The presidencies of George Washington and Theodore Roosevelt reveal the
importance of constitutional time in constructing and structuring constitutional mean-
ing. By all accounts, Roosevelt was the more forceful president in office, offering
a stewardship theory of executive power that had been unheard of in terms of its
authority—and never followed since his tenure. Roosevelt’s constitutional ambitions
were clear and bold, desiring a new direction for the nation consistent with his Pro-
gressive political commitments. Washington, by contrast, was deferential in office,
reading constitutional limits on his power quite literally and ceding ground to Con-
gress on an array of domestic matters. Washington’s constitutionalism was centered
on the Federalist vision of a competent, supreme national government that estab-
lished a more durable set of political foundations than those under the failed Articles
of Confederation. If the energy and boldness of executive action alone were the de-
ciding factors in establishing a lasting constitutional regime, then Roosevelt would
have provided the more durable legacy. However, the presence of constitutional time
rigged the comparison in favor of the first president because of the constitutional
opening that he inherited. President Washington had the sort of space available to
him that ensured his commitments and vision would endure the test of time, includ-
ing an immediate challenge from President Jefferson. By contrast, the first President
Roosevelt would have to await the presidency of a second President Roosevelt to
have his Progressive vision ensconced as part of the new constitutional baseline.
Theodore Roosevelt presided during important times as president. However, they were
not extraordinary times, and therein lies the difference between his constitutional leg-
acy and Washington’s.
There is little direct evidence that the leading American Founders used the word
“constitutional time,” and even less so during the actual Convention in Philadelphia.
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However, the challenges of creating a republic that could endure the types of cir-
cumstances and historical exigencies that prior republics failed to withstand ensured
that constitutional time would be accounted for in the institutions they created. The
most innovative of those institutions, the American presidency, would play a central
role in the orientation of the regime and its ability to withstand threats to the Republic.
It would be competent and incentivized to maintain and renew the regime in ways
that have played out repeatedly since Washington’s presidency in 1789. Constitutional
theory has not grasped the full implications of this process, although the renewed
scholarly interest in holistic approaches to constitutional law has suggested a way to
do so. This discussion provides an initial foray into assessing the ways constitutional
time has influenced the structure and meaning of constitutional law to the present.
